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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS ON EPA ACCESS 
Twentieth century technology has produced a wake of air, water, 
and terrestrial pollution in the United States. l Ironically, the nation 
1 See generally M. EISENBUD, ENVIRONMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND HEALTH (1978) for a 
historical outline of technology's role in pollution problems. Other invaluable sources of infor-
mation on technology and pollution control are the annual reports of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality which are transmitted to Congress pursuant to section 201 of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1982). For a comprehensive review of 
technological aspects of water pollution control, see N. NEMERO, INDUSTRIAL WATER POL-
LUTION: ORIGINS, CHARACTERISTICS, AND TREATMENT (2d ed. 1978). For an indictment of 
industry's and technology's role in the nation's hazardous waste dilemma, see M. BROWN, 
LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS (1979) and S. EpSTEIN, 
L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA (1982). For a similar treatment of 
interstate transport of air pollutants, see R. GOULD, GOING SOUR: SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF 
ACID RAIN (1985); R. OSTMANN, ACID RAIN (1982). For a comprehensive review of the same 
air pollution problems, see U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACID 
RAIN AND TRANSPORTED AIR POLLUTANTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1985). 
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also relies heavily upon technology and engineering to provide cures 
for these seemingly intractable environmental problems. 2 Efforts by 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to mount 
technological counterattacks against pollution problems created by 
technology are often stalled at the entrance gates of commercial 
property. For example, industry often refuses to voluntarily grant 
the access that EPA needs to investigate pollution problems, design 
Best Available Technology (BAT) permits to eliminate discharges of 
pollutants to waterways, or engineer technological remedies at haz-
ardous waste sites. 3 Lengthy and costly litigation often results, fore-
stalling the work of pollution abatement. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the constitutional, sta-
tutory, and policy considerations inherent in the access issue. Access 
refers broadly to any governmental presence on or near commercial 
property for the purpose of fulfilling EPA's statutory duties. Al-
though Agency access to inspect and investigate possible violations 
of pollution laws will be examined in some detail, the primary goal 
of the Article is the development of a coherent policy framework for 
those situations in which access is necessary to implement techno-
logical cures of known environmental hazards. 
Naturally, fourth amendment privacy issues and EPA's enabling 
statutes dominate the terrain upon which EPA access policy must 
be grounded. 4 Any governmental intrusion on private property that 
2 For example, both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act rely heavily upon technol-
ogy-forcing provisions to bring air emissions and effluent discharges under control. See, e.g., 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(h)(1), 7502(b) (1982); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (l)(B), (2)(A), (2)(E) (1982). 
Many commentators have criticized this technology-based approach. This Article is predicated 
upon the assumption that, despite the drawbacks of this approach, it will continue to be 
utilized in the foreseeable future. See Bonine, The Evolution of "Technology Forcing" in the 
Clean Air Act, BNA Env't. Rep., Monograph No. 21 (1975); Kramer, Economics, Technology 
and the Clean Air Amendment of 1970: The First Six Years, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161 (1976); 
Note, Technology-Based Emission and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient 
Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792 (1982). The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) is an example of a statute 
that is remedial by nature, and requires engineering and technological responses at existing 
hazardous waste sites. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). For an early overview of the 
technology developed to control hazardous waste, see GENERAL ELECTRIC, SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (1975); G. MASTERS, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRON-
MENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1974). For modern approaches to reducing pollution 
produced by technology, see D. SAROKIN, CUTTING CHEMICAL WASTES (1987). 
3 Each of these three issues will be dealt with in some detail. For a discussion of BAT 
permits, see infra notes 186-90, 228-37 and accompanying text; for a description of access 
needed for compliance investigations, see infra notes 31-89 and accompanying text; and for 
an analysis of access to hazardous waste sites, see infra notes 251-312 and accompanying 
text. 
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. All of the major environmental statutes authorize EPA access 
4 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:1 
constitutes a "search" under the fourth amendment triggers serious 
privacy considerations. 5 Sustaining such governmental intrusion 
against constitutional challenges largely depends upon the soundness 
of the Agency's statutory authorization for entry and access. 
The federal courts in recent years have reviewed three major EPA 
cases in which technological capability, statutory access authority, 
and constitutional considerations were inextricably wed. These cases 
will be used as vehicles for surveying existing law and policy gov-
erning EPA access, with a focus upon constitutional restraints, and 
as springboards for the development of recommendations to improve 
the existing policy framework. 
In the first of these cases, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,6 
the Supreme Court examined advanced technology as a tool for 
gaining "access" to commercial property. EPA used sophisticated 
aerial photography techniques to obtain information regarding Dow's 
compliance with the Clean Air Act at Dow's Midland, Michigan 
facility.7 This controversial and problematic case illustrates many of 
to private property for inspection and compliance purposes. See Clean Air Act (CAA) , 42 
U.S.C. § 7414 (1982) (authorized representatives of EPA may enter "emission sources"); Clean 
Water Act (CWA) , 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982 & Supp. v 1987) (authorized representatives of 
EPA may enter premises of "an effluent source"); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 
U. S. C. § 300j-4(b) (1982) (designated representatives of EPA may enter the facilities of water 
suppliers and other permittees); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6927 (1982) (officers, employees, and representatives of EPA may enter facilities where 
"hazardous wastes" are stored, handled, disposed, etc., as well as premises with underground 
storage facilities); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1982) (designated 
representatives of EPA may enter facilities where chemicals are made, stored, or processed); 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136f-g (1982) 
(officers and employees of EPA may enter facilities where pesticides and other regulated 
chemicals are held for distribution or sale); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604e (West Supp. 1988) (officers, 
employees, and representatives of EPA may enter facilities or vessels described in the Act). 
Only FIFRA mentions warrants, 7 U.S.C. § 136g(b) (1982), although recent amendments 
make it clear that EPA may use all lawful means for obtaining access under CERCLA. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 9604(e)(6) (West Supp. 1988). All of these statutes, except CERCLA and RCRA, 
require EPA representatives or officials to present credentials, or give advance notice, prior 
to entry. The CAA, CWA, and CERCLA access provisions are explored in detail infra notes 
83-89, 193-234, 276-307 and accompanying text. 
Fortunately, Congress authorized EPA to "enter" facilities under each of these statutes and 
precluded litigation that is inevitable when a statute uses only ambiguous terms such as 
"observe," "monitor," "access," or "inspect." See, e.g., Midwest Growers Coop. v. Kirkemo, 
533 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1976) (right to inspect records does not imply right of entry, since 
records can be reviewed elsewhere). In re Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(OSHA does not authorize Secretary of Labor to inspect employer's records and files in 
conjunction with a physical inspection of employer's plant). 
5 See infra notes 24-82 and accompanying text. 
6 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 810 (1985). 
7 749 F.2d at 309-10. 
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the threshold privacy considerations triggered by technology-aided 
access to commercial property, including: what constitutes a fourth 
amendment search; when may the agency proceed without obtaining 
a warrant; and what measures should be taken to protect proprietary 
information or trade secrets uncovered by the Agency during ac-
cess?8 
EPA uses access not only to determine whether a company is in 
compliance with the law, but also to fulfill its charge of participating 
in the design and implementation of technological fixes for pollution 
problems. Such was the case of Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA,9 in which 
the Agency sought access to Mobil Oil's petroleum refinery near 
Joliet, Illinois, in order to develop a BAT permit under the Clean 
Water Act.lO The Mobil case deserves detailed analysis because it 
illustrates the constitutional, statutory, and policy considerations 
inherent in access for the purpose of designing an environmental 
remedy on commercial property. 11 
Technological considerations became the paramount driving force 
behind governmental demands for access in Outboard Marine Corp. 
v. Thomas. 12 This seminal case illustrates all of the issues EPA faces 
in engineering and conducting cleanups on private land under haz-
ardous waste laws. In the OMC litigation, EPA sought access to the 
company's property adjacent to Waukegan Harbor, Illinois, a body 
of water highly contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) 
allegedly discharged by OMC.13 EPA intended to engineer and de-
sign a "remedial action" on OMC's commercial property under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA or Superfund).l4 In OMC, the courts faced 
constitutional and policy considerations under the fifth amendment 
taking and due process clauses, as well as statutory authorization 
8 See infra notes 31-97 and accompanying text. 
9716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984). 
10 I d. at 1189. 
11 See infra notes 179-250 and accompanying text. 
12 610 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), judgment vacated and 
remanded, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). 
13 610 F. Supp. at 1236-37. This Article deals exclusively with access, inspections, and 
cleanups effectuated by the federal government. Many state authorities have concurrent 
responsibility for implementing and enforcing the environmental statutes cited supra note 4. 
Except under the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-4(b)(2) (1982), EPA is not required to notify state 
officials before it exercises its own entry and access authority, even in those states where 
EPA has delegated environmental programs or granted the state "primacy." In practice, EPA 
and state environmental officials communicate regularly concerning local pollution problems 
and attempt to cooperate in taking effective and cost-efficient action at local facilities. 
1442 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). 
\ 
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and fourth amendment search and seizure questions. 15 The Super-
fund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 addressed all of 
the key statutory problems surfaced in the OMC litigation, 16 leaving 
only the fifth amendment questions unresolved. 
Several organizing strands are woven into the fabric of this Arti-
cle's legal and policy analysis. Foremost is the continuum of escalat-
ing privacy and property rights implicated as we examine govern-
mental actions that are progressively more intrusive. Those actions 
form a parallel continuum, starting with governmental observations 
performed without entering commercial property, to compliance in-
spections of short durations on commercial property, to long-term 
governmental presences on commercial property to design and ef-
fectuate remedial actions. Constitutionally permissible actions along 
these tracks encounter procedural and substantive hurdles designed 
to protect privacy and property rights. Warrantless activity is per-
missible only if no "search" has taken place on commercial property, 
or if one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirements of 
the fourth amendment exists. For many entries and inspections on 
commercial property, a warrant supported by administrative "prob-
able cause" is required before the government can act. As govern-
mental regulatory action intensifies in duration and intrusiveness, 
property rights may be impaired, implicating the fifth amendment 
taking clause and possibly requiring compensation. 
A simple diagram displays how these parallel tracks correlate the 
level of constitutional scrutiny with the intensity of EPA activities 
on private property. The diagram also lays bare the organizational 
skeleton of this Article, which proceeds from a consideration of 
nonintrusive off-site inspection activities to outright seizure of prop-
erty interests to effectuate cleanup. 
All along these continuums, technology wears many guises. Janus-
faced, technology may play, in the same drama, both a principal role 
as a source of pollution and as a means for rectifying serious health 
hazards. Technology is also cast in a number of supporting roles, 
often serving as the means for detecting violations or forming the 
basis for privacy claims when commercial property contains tech-
nologies that are trade secrets. 
It is hoped that a series of guidelines will emerge from this analysis 
that can be utilized to structure an effective, fair, and uniform policy 
for EPA access to commercial property. Resolution of these access 
15 See infra notes 259--361 and accompanying text. 
16 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
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No Search Search Search and 
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issues is a prerequisite to EPA's entering a new stage of effective-
ness in its pollution control efforts. 
II. ACCESS POLICY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR 
MINIMALL Y INTRUSIVE EPA INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 
The fourth amendment provides for "people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
... and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause."17 Few 
other areas of law have demanded more attention of the United 
States judiciary than this provision. It is therefore essential, from 
the outset, to narrow the focus of this discussion to only those 
locations on the fourth amendment map that are most germane to 
the EPA access issue. 
The government's reasons for conducting a search may be differ-
entiated in two ways: (1) separating civil (administrative) searches 
of business premises from criminal searches; and (2) distinguishing 
searches for the sake of determining compliance with statutes from 
searches related to other governmental ends, such as designing tech-
nological controls. A third useful distinction is between access ob-
tained pursuant to a warrant and access gained without a warrant. 
These relevant sUbcategories of fourth amendment consideration 
may be easily mapped in a three-dimensional space, which compart-
17 u.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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mentalizes the constitutional issues into eight subgroups.18 This Ar-
ticle is concerned primarily with civil (administrative) searches of 
business premises, conducted with and without warrants, for both 
compliance and remedial purposes. The category that illustrates all 
of the access issues under both the fourth and fifth amendments is 
that of administrative searches, with warrants, for the purpose of 
designing and constructing environmental remedies. 
A. Threshold Issues: Circumstances Which Trigger Fourth 
Amendment Protection for Commercial Property Owners 
1. Corporate and Commercial Owners as Persons Under the 
Fourth Amendment 
While the Constitution constrains many governmental activities 
on commercial property, EPA may work on or near commercial 
property in some circumstances without reference to those con-
straints. The express language of the fourth amendment protects 
"people" and secures them against unreasonable searches of their 
"persons, houses, papers and effects."19 In 1967, in the landmark 
Supreme Court cases of Camara v. Municipal Court20 and See v. 
City of Seattle ,21 the Court held that fourth amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches applies, at least in part, when a gov-
ernmental agency conducts an administrative search of a commercial 
facility. A long line of cases has also equated corporate entities with 
people, and analogized businesses and commercial property with 
homes, in determining whether the fourth amendment protection 
attaches at all. 22 
Traditionally, however, courts have afforded less privacy protec-
tion to commercial property, because the commercial owner's privacy 
interest "differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individ-
ual's home. "23 In fact, there are conditions under which the privacy 
18 See Appendix. 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
20 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
21 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In rendering its decisions in Camara the Supreme Court overruled 
its previous decision in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which held that regulatory 
or administrative searches were distinguishable from criminal searches, and therefore were 
not subject to the fourth amendment. 
22 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (extending fourth amendment 
protection to the business setting). 
23 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981); see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) ("[AJ business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, 
may open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context."); See 
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 1541, 545-46 (1967) (business premises may be inspected in many 
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interest in a commercial setting is deemed so inconsequential that 
no fourth amendment protection attaches. The most important of 
these conditions is when no "search" has taken place. 
2. The Existence of a "Search" as the Trigger for Fourth 
Amendment Protection 
"Search" is a term of art with special constitutional significance. 
Until 1967, the Supreme Court had interpreted the fourth amend-
ment as primarily protective of property and required that physical 
trespass be proven as a prerequisite to finding that a search had 
occurred.24 The Supreme Court dramatically modified this concept 
in the case of Katz v. United States,25 which emphasized that the 
fourth amendment, on its face, protects people, not property, and 
established a two-pronged test for determining if a search has oc-
curred. 26 First, the person claiming the fourth amendment protection 
must prove that he or she had an actual, or SUbjective, expectation 
of privacy in the area intruded upon by the government. 27 Second, 
that actual or subjective expectation must be one that society would 
deem reasonable. 28 
The Katz test protects an individual's actual or subjective privacy 
interest when that interest is reasonable. It is a formulation of yet 
another judicial balancing test, comparing the government's need 
for intrusion with the reasonableness of a citizen's desire to be free 
of governmental encroachment on privacy interests. While many 
scholars criticize the Katz test as being insufficiently protective of 
important privacy interests,29 the Supreme Court seems unprepared 
to abandon Katz's fundamental principles. 30 
more situations than private homes); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 
(1950) ("[C)orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to 
privacy."). 
24 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (construing Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928)). 
25 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
26 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's formulation has become the accepted 
test for a legal search. See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rakas v. Illinios, 
439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978). 
27 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740 
(citing with approval Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring». 
28 Id. 
29 See generally D. O'BRIEN, LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979); Amsterdam, Perspectives 
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,382-88 (1974); Note, A Reconsideration 
of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154 (1977). 
30 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (5-4 decision), aff'g 749 F.2d 
307 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'g 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
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The federal courts recently examined the question of when a 
search occurs while deciding the constitutionality of an EPA aerial 
inspection. In doing so, the courts established the foundation for 
EPA's policies governing searches which cause minimal intrusions 
on private property. 
B. Proceeding Without a Warrant and Expectations of Privacy: 
the Dow Overflight Case 
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, a sharply divided Supreme 
Court recently held that EPA's aerial surveillance and photography 
of a chemical manufacturing plant did not constitute a search under 
the fourth amendment. 31 A majority of five Justices reached this 
conclusion in a problematic opinion which failed to explicitly apply 
the Katz test, an approach that drew strong criticism from the four 
dissenting Justices. 32 To understand this important decision, an an-
alyst must carefully draw the facts of the case from the distinct 
district, appellate, and Supreme Court opinions. 33 
In 1977, EPA began an investigation of Dow Chemical's Midland, 
Michigan, plant to determine whether emissions from two coal-fired 
powerhouses exceeded federal air quality standards under the Clean 
Air Act. 34 An on-site inspection of Dow's power plants was conducted 
by EPA on September 9, 1977.35 EPA later requested and received 
from Dow schematic drawings depicting the physical layout of the 
powerhouses, as well as the boilers and turbines within the power-
houses. 36 When EPA called Dow and requested a second inspection 
for the purpose of taking photographs of the plant, the Agency was 
refused entry. 37 
Rather than securing a warrant, the Agency contracted with 
Abrams Aerial Survey Corporation to take detailed aerial photo-
31 Id. A majority of federal courts have found aerial surveillance constitutional in other 
contexts. See, e.g., California v. Cirialo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); United States v. Marbury, 
732 F.2d 390, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 
1980), cen. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 795 
(E.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Ky. 1980); United 
States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980). But see National Org. for 
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 965-66 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
32 Dow, 476 U.S. at 247 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
33 Id. at 229-30, 240-44; 749 F.2d at 309-10; 536 F. Supp. at 1357. 
34 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. at 1357. 
35 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d at 310. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
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graphs of the Dow facility.38 EPA's stated purposes for the aerial 
surveillance were the creation of visual documentation of smokestack 
emissions and the attainment of perspective on the layout of the 
plant. 39 EPA directed the contractor to take pictures of certain lo-
cations from certain angles, and advised the contractor of the times 
emissions would be most visible. 40 The overflight was performed on 
February 7, 1978.41 The resulting photographs contained vivid detail 
and resolution. 42 When Dow learned of the overflight from sources 
other than EPA, the company filed suit in federal district court 
seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 43 
The district court held that EPA violated Dow's fourth amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches. 44 The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision under a Katz 
analysis. 45 Ordinarily, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, a right of pri-
vacy exists only where there are "objective manifestations of [a] 
claimed privacy expectation." The court found no such manifesta-
tions relative to flights over Dow's property. 46 
The Supreme Court majority reviewed the same facts, and without 
explicitly invoking the Katz test, concluded that no search had oc-
curred. The majority viewed its principal task as deciding whether 
the industrial property between plants more resembled an "open 
field" or curtilage-property adjacent to private homes-for pur-
poses of fourth amendment analysis. 47 Ultimately, they concluded 
that the property EPA had photographed was more like an open 
field, and therefore held that Dow's expectations of privacy were 
unsupportable. 48 
The appellate court's analysis is more cogent and illuminating on 
the fourth amendment issue than the Supreme Court's search for 
analogous precedent, such as the open field doctrine. 49 Tacitly, the 
Supreme Court majority opinion embraced the conclusion that no 
"objective manifestation of the claimed privacy expectation"50 ex-
38 Id. 
39Id. 
4°Id. 
41 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
42Id. 
43Id. 
44 I d. at 1375. 
45 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 311-15 (6th Cir. 1984). 
46Id. at 312 (quoting Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1364). 
47 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236-38 (1986). 
48Id. at 239. 
49 See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
50 476 U.S. at 236-39. 
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isted, a conclusion that the Sixth Circuit reached explicitly. 51 In 
requiring that Dow clearly demonstrate its intent to be free from 
aerial surveillance under the Katz test, the Sixth Circuit held that: 
[The reasonable expectation of privacy test] determines whether 
there was a Fourth Amendment "search" at all and focuses on 
whether the human relationships that normally exist at the place 
inspected are based on intimacy, confidentiality, trust or solitude 
and hence give rise to a "reasonable" expectation of privacy 
The objective manifestations of a privacy expectation must be 
in some place and an expectation to be free from a certain kind 
of intrusion . . . . 
Dow did not take any precautions against aerial intrusions, 
even though the plant was near an airport . . . .52 
The court contrasted the lack of preventative measures against 
aerial search with the elaborate precautions Dow took to be free 
from ground-level intrusions. 53 Dow made no claim that business was 
actually transacted in the open space between plants photographed 
by EPA. While Dow asserted that photographs of the manufacturing 
equipment and conduits revealed trade secrets, the company failed 
to specify or describe the actual trade secrets or confidential infor-
mation endangered. Under those circumstances, the Sixth Circuit 
was not convinced that preventative measures, short of covering the 
whole complex, were unavailable. 54 Thus, the court found that the 
overflight observation of spaces outside Dow's buildings failed to 
constitute a search. 55 
The range of privacy expectations that can reasonably be evoked 
by an individual's location and business surroundings was probably 
what prompted the Supreme Court to focus on the "open field" and 
"curtilage" doctrines in an effort to find analogous fourth amendment 
precedent. The Supreme Court initially articulated the "open field" 
exception to the need for warrants in Hester v . United States, 56 
where a warrantless search of a field was allowed because the prop-
erty was open to public view. 57 The Supreme Court expanded the 
51 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Dow Chern. 
Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (E.D. Mich. 1982)). 
52 749 F.2d at 311-12. 
53 Id. at 312-13. 
54 Id. But see Dow, 476 U.S. at 241 & n.l (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
55 749 F.2d at 313. 
56 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
57 Id. at 59. 
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doctrine in the environmental context, by concluding in Air Pollu-
tion Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp. 58 that privately owned 
lands were also "open fields" as long as the public was able to enter. 59 
In a similar vein, courts have found that pollutants discharged into 
a public waterway have been "abandoned to ... public exposure. "60 
Consequently, when governmental officers sample the effluent 
from a public waterway, no fourth amendment search or seizure 
occurs. 61 
The Dow majority, however, recognized that the industrial prop-
erty photographed by EPA was in some respects neither open nor 
a field. 62 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the privacy expec-
tations triggered by such industrial space were more analogous to 
those engendered by open fields than by curtilage to private homes. 63 
In refusing to create an "industrial curtilage" doctrine, the major-
ity, as well as the Sixth Circuit, emphasized the differences in the 
expectations of privacy that an owner of commercial property enjoys 
compared with that afforded an individual in the sanctity of the 
property surrounding his or her home. 64 Courts have traditionally 
considered certain areas outside homes or dwellings as part of the 
dwelling for fourth amendment purposes. Previous cases had found 
that the fourth amendment applies to the search of smokehouses 
located within a fenced yard and to a search of a honeysuckle patch 
situated within a fence 150 feet from a home. 65 The appellate court 
in Dow summarily dismissed the notion that the curtilage doctrine 
should be applied to a 2000-acre manufacturing facility consisting of 
numerous covered buildings, with manufacturing equipment and pip-
ing between buildings. 66 
A final pivotal issue in the case was the role of various trade secret 
laws in assessing Dow's claims of expectations of privacy. The Su-
58 416 U.S. 861 (1974). 
59 [d. at 865. 
60 United States v. Syncon Resins, Inc., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1305, 1308 (D. N.J. May 
29, 1981). 
61 [d. at 1308-09. 
62 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986). 
63 [d. at 239. 
64 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312-14 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 
at 235, 237-38. For a review of the history of the curtilage doctrine and the impact of aerial 
surveillance, see Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains 
for the Curtilage, 60 N. Y. U.L. REV. 725-60 (1985). 
65 United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1981); Robertson v. United States, 
165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948). 
66 749 F.2d at 314. 
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preme Court was sharply divided on this point.67 Dow never specified 
what, if any, trade secrets were observable by aerial photographic 
means similar to those used by EPA. 68 Both the Supreme Court 
majority and the circuit court stated that no precautions were taken 
to prevent observation of any secrets from the air,69 although the 
dissenting Justices noted that Dow considered the costs of enclosing 
the entire area financially prohibitive and unwise from a safety per-
spective. 70 
The Dow majority concluded that trade secret laws and Dow's 
procedures were irrelevant to a fourth amendment analysis, since 
those laws and procedures were designed to prevent piracy of trade 
secrets by competitors of Dow, and not to stop inspections or obser-
vation by the United States government for environmental compli-
ance purposes. 71 Indeed, the Clean Air Act anticipates that EPA 
will occasionally obtain proprietary information during the course of 
investigations and inspections. Both the Clean Air Act and Agency 
regulations contain explicit provisions for protecting trade secrets 
once in the hands of the government. 72 
Whatever privacy expectations Dow had relative to protecting 
putative trade secrets from discovery during overflights by compet-
itors, it seems reasonably clear that those expectations did not ex-
tend to the government. Nevertheless, the dissenting Justices and 
the district court, citing the various trade secret laws, concluded 
that society recognized legitimate interests in preserving the privacy 
of Dow's open-air plants.73 Leapfrogging the question of whether 
Dow had demonstrated any actual or subjective expectations of pri-
vacy from aerial surveillance, the dissent concluded that Dow's as-
serted expectations were "reasonable" because they had been af-
firmed by society in the form of trade secret laws. 74 
Commentators have roundly criticized the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in the Dow case. 75 Both the majority and the dissent gloss 
67 Compare 476 U.S. at 232--33 with 476 U.S. at 248-49. 
68 See id. 
69 749 F.2d at 312-13, afi'd, 476 U.S. at 230. 
70 476 U.S. at 240-41 & n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
71 476 U.S. at 231--32. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1982). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c); 40 C.F.R. pt. 2, subpt. B (1987). 
73 476 U.S. at 248-49 (Powell, J., dissenting); 536 F. Supp. at 1367. 
74 476 U.S. at 249. 
75 See, e.g., Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance After Ciraolo and Dow Chemical: The 
Omniscient Eye in the Sky, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 305 (1986); Note, Eyes in the Sky, The 
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance, 52 Mo. L. REV. 507, 521 (1987); Note, 
Constitu(ional Law: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States: Aerial Searches, Business Premises, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 40 OKLA. L. REV. 248 (1987); Case Note, Administrative 
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over important issues, leaving the viability of aerial photographic 
surveillance in a clouded state pending further judicial clarification. 
The majority opinion is most clearly flawed for its failure to explicitly 
follow the Sixth Circuit's lead and apply the Katz test. 76 The major-
ity's examination of the open field and curtilage doctrines proved a 
poor substitute for the Katz analysis. 
The majority's careless analysis also trivialized very real privacy 
concerns. Statements in dicta could be construed as retrenchment 
on well-established fourth amendment doctrine. For example, the 
Justices emphasized that the government was not physically present 
on Dow property-a statement that disturbed the dissent and com-
mentators because trespass had long been repUdiated as a prereq-
uisite to showing a fourth amendment violation. 77 Moreover, in un-
necessarily down-playing the intrusive nature of the photographic 
technology used by EPA compared with other state-of-the-art sur-
veillance technology,78 the majority appeared to enter murky ana-
lytical waters where constitutional protection directly depends upon 
the precise government surveillance technology used. 79 This ap-
proach is clearly unwise unless coupled with a rigorous application 
of the Katz expectation of privacy test and an examination of the 
reasonableness of the intrusion under the circumstances of the case. 
The dissent's reasoning was equally bankrupt. While trade secret 
laws are arguably relevant to the fourth amendment calculus, they 
are not dispositive. Dow did not demonstrate to any court that 
specific trade secrets, proprietary information, or business relation-
ships would be compromised by EPA's flyover. The dissent should 
not have assumed that Dow had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the open areas between industrial complexes without evidence of 
some business information, association, or relationship in that area 
capable of being compromised by flyover. Unfortunately, because 
the Dow case was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment, 80 
the record contains nothing more than Dow's bald assertion that 
trade secrets and proprietary information were observable from the 
air. 81 
Inspections from Above: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), 56 U. 
CrN. L. REV. 361, 379 (1987). 
76 See supra notes 50--55 and accompanying text. 
77 See 476 U.S. at 247-48; see also Case Note, Administrative Inspections from Above: Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), 56 U. CrN. L. REV. 361, 380-81 (1987). 
78 476 U.S. at 238. 
79 Id. at 238-39. 
80 Id. at 230. 
81 Id. at 247. 
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Under the circumstances, the dissent could not logically reach the 
conclusion that it did under the expectation of privacy doctrine. An 
assessment of Dow's expectation of privacy is impossible without 
first determining the identity, size, and location of objects capable 
of revealing trade secrets when observed from the air. Only then 
could the dissent assess whether Dow's failure to take preventative 
measures, short of enclosing the entire plant, was reasonable. For 
instance, the facts may have suggested that a simple tarp could have 
prevented disclosure of some proprietary information. 
Moreover, a factual conclusion that Dow did all it could to prevent 
aerial observation of trade secrets begins, rather than concludes, 
the expectation of privacy analysis. The trade secret laws do not 
prohibit photographs per se taken by private citizens, let alone by 
the government. Rather, the laws only prohibit photography taken 
with an intent to appropriate and use trade secrets. 82 The dissent 
thus ignored thE' critical issue of what expectations of privacy could 
be engendered by a law that prohibits unfair use of photographs by 
co.mpetitors, but says nothing about governmental use of even ad-
mittedly proprietary information obtained during an overflight. 
The approach and reasoning of the circuit court in Dow are pref-
erable to either the Supreme Court majority or dissenting opinions. 
More important than the ultimate result in the Dow case, however, 
are certain policy implications for EPA actions that can be derived 
from the opinions. 
C. Policy Implications of the Dow Case 
1. Scope of the EPA Investigative and Inspection Authority 
In Dow, the Supreme Court unanimously held that EPA's inves-
tigatory and inspection authority in section 114 of the Clean Air Act 
encompassed aerial photography, even though that technique is not 
expressly listed in the Act. 83 In sweeping language that strengthens 
entry and access programs under all of EPA's statutes, the Dow 
Court held that Congress gave EPA broad investigatory and en-
forcement authority without "spelling out precisely how this author-
ity was to be exercised in all the myriad circumstances that might 
82 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 u.s.c. §§ 7411(h)(1), 7414 (1982); 40 C.F.R. pt. 2, subpt. B 
(1987). 
83 476 U.S. at 234, 244 & n.8. 
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arise in monitoring matters relating to clean air and water stan-
dards."84 
Commercial enterprises will, therefore, find it extremely difficult 
to successfully litigate claims that specified investigation techniques 
are beyond the scope of EPA's various statutory authorities. Even 
though section 114(a) of the Clean Air Act simply provides for a 
"right of entry to, upon, or through any premises,"85 the Supreme 
Court said that the section expanded, not restricted, EPA's general 
powers to investigate. 86 EPA needed no explicit authority to employ 
methods of observation commonly available to the public. 87 Regula-
tory and enforcement authorities generally carry along "all the 
modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally employed or useful 
to execute the authority granted."88 In this vein, the Court noted 
that 
[w]hen Congress invests an agency with enforcement and inves-
tigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly each 
and every technique that may be used in the course of executing 
the statutory mission. Aerial observation authority, for example, 
is not usually expressly extended to police for traffic control, but 
it could hardly be thought necessary for a legislative body to tell 
police that aerial observation could be employed for traffic con-
trol of a metropolitan area, or to expressly authorize police to 
send messages to ground highway patrols that a particular over-
the-road truck was traveling in excess of 55 miles per hour. 
Common sense and ordinary human experience teach that traffic 
violators are apprehended by observation.89 
Less clear than EPA's statutory authority to use a wide range of 
investigative techniques is the issue of whether or not it is wise 
policy to employ high-technology electronic surveillance in ordinary 
inspection cases. 
84 [d. at 233; see also Public Servo Co. of Indiana v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind. 1981) 
(section 114 authorizes the taking of photographs at emission sources in another context), 
afl'd, 682 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2)(a) (1982). 
86 476 U.S. at 234. 
87 [d. 
88 [d. at 233. 
89 [d. Industry has unsuccessfully challenged EPA's entry and inspection authority under 
the Clean Air Act, especially the scope of the Agency activities while on commercial property. 
See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. Lead and Zinc Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Public Servo Co. of Indiana v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind. 1981), afl'd, 682 F.2d 626 
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983). Others have gone further and asserted that 
administrative warrants authorize entry but not the right to search. Bunker Ltd. Partnership 
v. United States, Civ. No. 85-2133 (D. Idaho 1985), stay pending appeal denied. 
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2. High Technology, the Fourth Amendment, and Electronic 
Surveillance 
EPA's use of electronic surveillance has withstood its first impor-
tant legal test. However, sound policy considerations may dictate 
that the Agency not utilize such techniques in all situations simply 
because it is legal. 
The Dow Court found that the sophisticated technology used to 
obtain the extreme detail of the photographs did not violate the 
fourth amendment under the "enhanced viewing" doctrine. 9o Several 
previous cases held that enhanced viewing of the interior of a home 
impairs a legitimate expectation of privacy.91 The Sixth Circuit in 
Dow correctly noted that the Ninth Circuit decision in United States 
v. Allen92 was closer to the point than cases focusing on residential 
areas. 93 In Allen, the court held that enlarged aerial photographs of 
commercial buildings and grounds which showed details of drug 
smuggling operations were not searches under the fourth amend-
ment. The court observed that the case did not present "privacy 
expectation[s] associated with the interior of residences or other 
structures. "94 In Dow, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to 
emphasize that EPA did not use satellite technology or other leading-
edge photographic capability,95 a fact that the dissent found wholly 
irrelevant. 96 Thus, the courts have yet to definitely dispose of the 
legal issues surrounding EPA's use of electronic surveillance. 
Regardless of the legality of the flyover, the American public is 
hesitant to condone the use of sensory-enhancing technology by the 
government to monitor the activities of citizens and businesses. 
Witness the enormous degree of safeguards now required before a 
wiretap can be utilized by the federal government pursuant to the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.97 Electronic 
90 476 u.s. at 238-39. 
91 For example, in United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980), the court 
held that looking into a dwelling window using a telescopic lens invades fourth amendment 
privacy interests. 
92 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980). 
93 749 F.2d at 314 n.2. 
94 633 F.2d at 1289. 
95 476 U.S. at 238. 
96 [d. at 251 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
97 18 U.S.C.A. 2510-2520 (West 1970 & Supp. 1989). Title III of the Act was triggered by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (detailed discussion 
of constitutionality of a "bugging device" installed in an office pursuant to court order and 
New York statute). See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2153. For an early discussion of the privacy interests involved 
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surveillance, whether audio or visual, poses unusually severe threats 
to the privacy values protected by the fourth amendment. EPA 
would be well advised to adopt a policy that circumscribes the use 
of aerial photography and other sensory enhancement techniques to 
those cases that clearly require such extraordinary means. 
As a rough guide, such methods should only be used when (1) 
other avenues of inspection or access are inadequate to meet valid 
governmental purposes; (2) serious environmental violations are sus-
pected; (3) statutory and regulatory safeguards, designed to protect 
business trade secrets obtained, either purposefully or unintention-
ally, are vigorously followed; and (4) obtaining an ex parte warrant 
is infeasible. The circumstances in Dow failed to meet either factor 
(1) or (4) of these guidelines, suggesting that EPA probably could 
have avoided at least part of the delay and consumption of Agency 
resources had it obtained an ex parte warrant. In fact, the Agency 
never used the photographs in any subsequent enforcement pro-
ceeding. 
These suggested criteria are, however, clearly inappropriate for 
those circumstances where advanced technology can be utilized with-
out compromising trade secrets or other privacy interests. For ex-
ample, the newly developed LIDAR detection system is a form of 
radar capable of detecting and measuring particular air emissions. 98 
This system, which may be used at night when traditional detection 
in overflights, see Dean v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 115-18, 
110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588-89 (1973). One of the most eloquent statements of societal concerns 
with electronic surveillance was made by Justice Douglas in dissent in United States v. White, 
401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971): 
Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known. How 
most forms of it can be held 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
is a mystery. To be sure, the Constitution and Bill of Rights are not to be read as 
covering only the technology known in the 18th century. Otherwise its concept of 
'commerce' would be hopeless when it comes to the management of modern affairs. 
At the same time the concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, 
proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign purposes, to penetrate all the 
walls and doors which men need to shield them from the pressures of a turbulent life 
around them and give them the health and strength to carryon .... 
. . . [E]lectronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdropping. They make 
it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a free society. 
Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police omniscient; and police omniscience 
is one of the most effective tools of tyranny. 
Id. at 759 (quoting in part Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting». 
98 LIDAR: Selective Long-Distance Detection of Atmospheric Pollution, Laser Application 
Center (CAL), Swiss Federal Institute of Tech., Switzerland (EPFL) 1987. 
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methods fail, reveals no trade secrets and operates on emissions 
abandoned into the ambient air. No logical or constitutional reasons 
exist to require EPA to obtain a warrant to use LIDAR to detect 
emissions in "plain view." 
The Dow case illustrates other legal and policy considerations that 
are relevant to deciding when EPA should inspect, monitor, or enter 
commercial property without first obtaining a warrant. The next 
section deals with warrantless governmental activities that, unlike 
the Dow overflight, are clearly subject to the fourth amendment 
because a search has taken place. 
D. Gaining Access Without a Warrant Under the Pervasively 
Regulated Business Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
EPA is seldom able to investigate, inspect, or remedy a problem 
at a commercial site without physically entering the property. Ex-
cept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, warrantless physical 
searches or inspections are unreasonable and thus violate the fourth 
amendment. 99 
Nevertheless, traditional criminal law exceptions to the warrant 
requirement apply to administrative searches as well. By far the 
most important exception covers inspections or searches conducted 
pursuant to consent of the property owner.100 Other exceptions de-
veloped in criminal law cases include searches incident to valid ar-
rests,101 seizure of items in plain view,I02 border searches, and 
searches in exigent circumstances or emergencies that preclude ob-
taining a warrant.103 Because EPA often relies on consent of the 
99 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978). The Barlow's case has been 
the subject of extensive analysis. See, e.g., Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1979). The Supreme Court has long recognized that even warrantless 
searches may be "reasonable." The separate constitutional requirement that probable cause 
support the issuance of any warrant does not preclude warrantless searches. Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1924); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
100 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
101 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest). 
102 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (plain view). 
103 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit of fleeing felon). The case of Balelo 
v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982), may signify a trend toward recognizing an additional 
exception to the warrant requirement. In Balelo, the court held that officials at the Depart-
ment of Commerce, which had granted a permit to a group allowing the group to capture 
porpoises, did not need a warrant to board the group's boat and observe the capture. Gov-
ernmental presence was deemed a "permit condition" rather than a search. Id. at 764-67. 
This case could have far-reaching implications for warrantless access to insure compliance 
with NPDES and RCRA permits under the clean water and hazardous waste laws. See infra 
notes 105-45 and accompanying text. 
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property owner for access, the consent exception will be discussed 
in some detail later in the Article. 104 Most of the other exceptions to 
the warrant requirement are inapplicable to the bulk of the Agency 
access situations that are the focus of this discussion. 
The "pervasively regulated business" exception to the warrant 
requirement is, however, important to structuring EPA access pol-
icy. The philosophy behind this exception was stated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: 105 
Certain industries have such a history of government oversight 
that no reasonable expectation of privacy [citing Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)] could exist for a proprietor over the 
stock of such an enterprise. Liquor . . . and firearms . . . are 
industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such 
a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full 
arsenal of government regulation. 106 
The Court reasoned that property owners who voluntarily engage 
in federally licensed and heavily regulated industries, in effect, con-
sent to the restrictions placed on them. 107 
The Dow majority did not reach this issue, although the dissenting 
Justices and the district court found that EPA's authority to regulate 
the chemical industry under the Clean Air Act did not justify a 
warrantless search.108 The district court held that the Clean Air Act 
inspection scheme under section 114 was more akin to the general 
regulatory authority given to OSHA and dealt with in the Barlow's 
case.109 The argument was not reconsidered by the circuit court, 110 
104 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 & n.19 (1967) and authorities cited therein. 
Warrantless searches conducted pursuant to consent are discussed in detail, infra notes 146-
52 and accompanying text. Administrative and criminal warrants are governed by many of 
the same principles. See Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 769 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1985); Donovan 
v. Mosher Steel Co., 791 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1986). The level of probable cause required is 
an important difference. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text. Moreover, Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 has special requirements for criminal warrants. 
105 436 U.S. 307 (1978). For one commentator's view of the impact of the Barlow's decision 
on EPA access, see Martin, EPA and Administrative Inspections, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 123 
(1979). 
106 436 U.S. at 313; see also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United State:;, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) 
(liquor sales); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms). 
107 436 U.S. at 313. 
108 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 245-46 (1986); Dow, 536 F. Supp 1355, 
1361 (E.D. Mich. 1982); see also Case Note, Inspections from Above: Dow Chemical Co. v. 
United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 361, 384 (1987). 
109 536 F. Supp. at 1361. 
110 749 F.2d 307,311 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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although the dissent in the Supreme Court flatly concluded that the 
pervasive regulation doctrine was inapplicable. III 
Several factors support the district court's conclusion. The regu-
latory inspection scheme allowed to proceed without warrants in 
previous cases targeted single industries-liquor112 and firearm 
sales. 113 The Clean Air Act applies to all sources of air pollution 
emissions. A finding that the Clean Air Act and its attendant regu-
lations constitute a pervasive regulation of industry would be tan-
tamount to giving EPA the authority to enter any source of air 
emissions without a warrant. Moreover, the Clean Air Act does not 
contain a pervasive licensing or regulatory scheme similar to those 
governing firearms, liquor sales, or mine operation. 114 The ordinary 
emission source is probably not subject to sufficient numbers of 
regular or periodic inspections under the Clean Air Act to alter the 
source owner's expectations of privacy. However, the applicability 
of the doctrine to other environmental programs requires further 
analysis. In developing the pervasively regulated business excep-
tion, early Supreme Court cases emphasized that industries long 
subject to close supervision and inspection fell under the exception. 
That analysis led some to believe that only long-standing statutory 
and regulatory schemes could qualify as "pervasive regulations." 
Such beliefs were dispelled when the Supreme Court began em-
phasizing "a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence"115 
as a prerequisite to warrantless business searches, leaving the door 
open to arguments that the pervasive regulation exception applies 
in other environmental contexts. In Donovan v. DeweY,116 the Court 
stressed the nature of the regulatory scheme over its historical 
legitimacy. 
Under appellee's view, new or emerging industries, including 
ones such as the nuclear power industry that pose enormous 
potential safety and health problems, could never be subject to 
warrantless searches even under the most carefully structured 
inspection program simply because of the recent vintage of reg-
ulation .... 
III 476 U.S. at 245-46. The Barlow's Court, in dicta, implied that the Clean Air Act did not 
envision warrantless searches, except pursuant to consent. The Court noted that the Act 
granted authority for EPA to obtain a court order when entry is refused. 436 U.S. at 321 & 
n.1S. 
112 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
113 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
114 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 604 (1961). 
115 Id. 
116Id. 
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The Fourth Amendment's central concept of reasonableness 
will not tolerate such arbitrary results. 117 
23 
The clear implication from this statement, as well as the Supreme 
Court holdings in previous cases,118 is that warrantless searches 
could be utilized under select environmental regulatory schemes, 
even though they were only recently promulgated. Several of the 
recently enacted environmental statutes are designed to meet urgent 
health and safety concerns and to broadly regulate specific targeted 
emerging industries. 
For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 119 to~ether with its attendant regulations,120 provides one 
of the most comprehensive regulatory programs ever attempted, 
and is designed to ensure proper treatment, storage, and disposal 
of hazardous waste. 121 At least three entities in the emerging indus-
tries of hazardous waste management-treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facilities-are probably governed by "pervasive regulation." 
These facilities are subject to a manifest system designed to generate 
a "cradle to grave" paper trail which traces hazardous waste from 
the site of generation to proper treatment and storage locations. 122 
Moreover, treatment, storage, and disposal facilities must obtain a 
permit from EPA, or the states to which the program has been 
delegated, in order to operate. 123 Most importantly, EPA regulates 
nearly every aspect of hazardous waste landfills, from design of the 
facilities to their operation. 124 
Thus, hazardous waste landfill operators probably meet the early 
Supreme Court tests governing the "pervasive regulation" exception 
to the warrant requirement. Treatment and storage facilities, as 
117 I d. at 606. 
118 See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982). See generally J. QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTES (1982); Worobeck, An Analysis of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 11 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 633 (1980) for an overview of the major aspects of these 
regulatory controls. 
120 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-67 (1985). For a critical examination of these regulations as they were 
initially promulgated, see Friedland, The New Hazardous Waste Management System: Reg-
ulation of Waste or Wasted Regulation, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89 (1981). 
121 See supra note 119. 
12242 U.S.C. § 6903(12) (1982). 
123Id. § 6925. EPA has approved adequate state plans designed to implement solid waste 
management programs, including the permit process, under RCRA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6926, 6946-47 (1982). States with approved programs may access commercial facilities and 
conduct inspections in the same manner as EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1982). See QUARLES, 
supra note 119, at chs. 7-8. 
12447 Fed. Reg. 32,274 (1982). 
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discrete industries concerned with hazardous waste only, arguably 
fall within the exception as well. 
This conclusion is somewhat less clearcut under the Supreme 
Court's most recent pronouncements on the exception in New York 
v. Burger. 125 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld warrantless 
searches of vehicle dismantling businesses under aNew York statute 
that authorized police officers and other officials to examine motor 
vehicles, parts, and records on commercial property during regular 
business hours.126 Although not an environmental case, Burger es-
tablished a three-pronged test that has broad implications for envi-
ronmental entry and inspection programs based on warrantless 
searches under the pervasively regulated business exception. 
For such searches to be constitutionally reasonable, there must 
be a "substantial government interest" that guides the inspection 
scheme; the warrantless inspections must be "necessary to further 
the regulatory scheme;" and the statute's inspection program, in 
terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide 
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. 127 This final 
prong means that the program must adequately advise the owner of 
the property that the search is being made pursuant to the law and 
has a properly defined scope limiting the discretion of the inspecting 
officers. 128 
RCRA clearly meets the first two prongs of this test. The gov-
ernment's interest in controlling hazardous and toxic chemicals is 
precisely the type of substantial governmental interest that the 
Supreme Court has identified as acceptable in the "pervasively reg-
ulated business" lines of cases. The number of inspections required 
each year, together with the need for some surprise visits, make 
warrantless searches a necessary part of an effective RCRA entry 
and inspection scheme. 129 
The third prong of the test is more problematic. Like other envi-
ronmental laws, the RCRA entry and inspection scheme clearly 
notifies hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities 
that the search is being conducted pursuant to law. The scope of the 
125 482 U. S. 691 (1987). 
126Id. at 708. 
127 I d. at 702. 
128 Id. 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (1982). RCRA calls for mandatory periodic inspections, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6927(e), strengthening the argument that the pervasively regulated business exception 
applies. Compare other environmental access provisions as summarized supra note 4. 
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RCRA search, however, may be very broad-perhaps insufficiently 
limited in time, place, and scope to pass the third prong that the 
Burger Court derived from its previous decision in United States v. 
Biswell. 130 Conclusive resolution of this potential bar to EPA use of 
the exception must await judicial decisions in the environmental 
area. The better view, bolstered by the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court cases taken as a whole, is that the Agency may search haz-
ardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities under the 
pervasively regulated business exception to the warrant require-
ment. 
Since nearly any industrial concern is capable of generating haz-
ardous waste,l:1 generator facilities probably would not fall within 
the exception based on the early Supreme Court decisions. Similarly, 
common carriers and others in the business of transporting many 
items, including hazardous waste, would likely fall outside the ex-
ception. 
Arguments that certain hazardous waste facilities are pervasively 
regulated apply with even greater persuasive force to the pesticide 
industry. Federal pesticide regulation dates back to 1947, with the 
current statutory version entitled the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).132 That Act requires the regis-
tration or licensing of all pesticides. 133 Thus, pesticide manufacturers 
probably fall into the same category of pervasively regulated busi-
nesses as firearm and liquor sales did in Colonnade and Biswell. 
Less persuasive arguments could be made in two additional en-
vironmental fields. In 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA)134 was enacted with the view toward establishing a compre-
hensive program of federal regulatory control of the manufacture 
and use of toxic chemicals. TSCA was an attempt to effectively deal 
with a myriad of chemicals already in the stream of commerce, and 
to control the manufacture of new toxic chemicals each year. Under 
TSCA, the manufacture of new chemicals must submit a "pre-man-
ufacturing notice" to EPA before production commences. 135 EPA 
regulates chemicals already on the market by requiring manufactur-
130 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972). 
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), (27) (1982). Hazardous waste is broadly defined. Id. 
132 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982). 
133Id. § 136a. 
134 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1982). For an excellent overview of TSCA, see lA F. GRAD, 
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4A.02 (1981). 
135 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982). 
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ers to test existing chemical substances for adverse health and en-
vironmental effects. 136 EPA may restrict or ban the manufacture, 
use, storage, and disposal of a chemical if it "presents or will present 
an unreasonable risk of injury to the health or environment. "137 
As with RCRA regulations targeting all generators of hazardous 
waste, however, these regulations reach so many and such varied 
industries that it is unlikely that a court would find that the "per-
vasive regulation" exception to the warrant requirement applied. 
While the chemical industry is the leading manufacturer and storer 
of toxic chemicals, the industry itself is far from homogeneous, being 
comprised of such diverse business enterprises as pharmaceuticals 
and petrochemicals. In addition, the Agency has made only limited 
use of its regulation-promulgating authority under TSCA. There-
fore, it is unlikely that the courts would find a pervasive EPA 
regulatory presence in the chemical industry by virtue of TSCA. An 
important exception to this generalization is the small segment of 
the chemical industry that manufactures polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs), which TSCA expressly governs. 138 PCBs are also one of the 
few chemicals that are subject to comprehensive EPA regulations 
promulgated under TSCA.139 
An intriguing possibility, one the courts have not considered, is 
whether or not certain industries subjected simultaneously to nu-
merous environmental statutes and regulatory frameworks are "per-
vasively regulated" by EPA to such an extent that little or no fourth 
amendment privacy rights attach. For example, certain chemical 
industries are governed simultaneously by numerous environmental 
provisions, potentially including TSCA, FIFRA, RCRA, and even 
the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts. Although it has never been 
argued, this approach appears to be consistent with the theory un-
derlying the "pervasively regulated" exception to the warrant re-
quirement. That is, when an entrepreneur embarks upon a simul-
taneously regulated business, he voluntarily chooses to subject 
himself to the full arsenal of governmental regulation. 140 
136 I d. § 2603. 
137 I d. § 2605. 
138Id. § 2605(c). 
139 See 40 C.F.R. § 761 (1988). 
140 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). Such industries are subject to a 
multiplicity of civil and judicial enforcement provisions as well. The problem with urging that 
simultaneous multiple regulation provides a pervasive regulatory presence is that it may prove 
too much. If we do not limit our analysis to environmental regulation, it is hard to imagine 
an American industry which is not pervasively regulated when the full range of governmental 
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Businesses that must obtain EPA or state environmental per-
mits-such as dischargers under the Clean Water Act NPDES per-
mit system or RCRA landfill operators-are forms of licensed in-
dustries that initially gave rise to the pervasively regulated business 
exception. 141 EPA's warrantless search of such operators' properties 
is probably sustainable. More importantly, EPA may draft permits 
which obviate the need for warrants by conditioning receipt of the 
permit on the operator's granting EPA reasonable access to conduct 
inspections and other compliance-related activities without the need 
for a warrant. 
The potential usefulness of the pervasively regulated business 
exception varies from one statutory access program to another. A 
court determining whether an industry is pervasively regulated must 
first look at two factors: the nature of the industry to be inspected 
and the Agency's statutory and regulatory authority to gain entry 
and conduct inspection or remedial activities and to regulate in gen-
eral. 
Two environmental statutes-the Clean Air Act142 and the Noise 
Control Act143-provide for the regulation of a broad group of in-
dustries, similar to OSHA, and the courts are likely to find war-
rantless searches under these statutes unconstitutional. Many of the 
industries regulated under four other EPA enabling statutes-FI-
FRA, RCRA, TSCA, and the Safe Drinking Water Act-belong to 
well-defined industrial subgroups that the federal government has 
intensively regulated. Therefore, a court might sustain as constitu-
tional EPA's warrantless search of a pesticide manufacturing facility, 
a hazardous waste dump site, a plant producing PCBs, or a private 
source of drinking water. 
Other statutory regimens, such as the Clean Water Act's NPDES 
permit requirements for discharges to the nation's waterways, 144 
may authorize warrantless access to permittee property based on 
conditions specified in the permit. An NPDES permit may constitute 
presence is accounted for, from antitrust to zoning. See Note, Rationalizing Administrative 
Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (1979). 
141 The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) of permits is established 
by the Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982), and attendant regulations. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 120 (1988). Access to permittee property to monitor compliance with the permit may become 
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying 
text. 
14242 U.S.C. §§ 7401-42 (1988). 
143 [d. §§ 4901-18 (1988). 
144 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
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a type of business "license" under the pervasively regulated business 
doctrine. 
The applicability of the pervasively regulated business doctrine to 
EPA searches will remain uncertain, however, until the courts have 
applied the tripartite Burger test to various environmental inspec-
tion and entry statutes. 145 Policy considerations dictate that the 
Agency proceed with care and forethought before conducting war-
rantless searches even when an exception to the warrant require-
ment applies and statutory authority is clear. 
E. Policy Implications of Relying on Consent or Otherwise 
Conducting a Search Without a Warrant 
In performing routine environmental inspections, EPA's preferred 
method of gaining access is to obtain consent, obviating the need to 
obtain a warrant. Consent validates the search if permission is given 
"freely and voluntarily" by an individual in possession of the property 
or otherwise authorized to give consent. 146 
Ordinarily, Agency officials should not simply present themselves 
at industrial property and assume consent will be given. This risks 
the possibility that entry will be refused. Faced with such refusal, 
145 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. Even if a court found that a warrantless 
search is unconstitutional under these statutes, it is possible that the Agency's strategic 
utilization of the argument in warrant cases would cause the courts to consider the level of 
privacy expectation that can reasonably attach to such commercial enterprises. Thus, greater 
deference to EPA's assertions of administrative probable cause under a warrant, or reliance 
on broadly worded affidavits supporting search warrants, might be a collateral benefit to use 
of this argument. 
146 Only a brief summary of the enormous body of doctrine which governs consent can be 
presented here. Most of it is derived from criminal law cases. Voluntariness is judged on the 
totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the search and the characteristics of the 
person who consented. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-29 (1973). Corporate 
officials are considered "sophisticated," and unlikely to be coerced into granting consent to 
search. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); United States v. 
Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 388 
(9th Cir. 1976). Some courts have intimated that the requirements for valid consent are 
somewhat reduced in the administrative search context. Davis, 328 U.S. at 593-94; United 
States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1970). Valid consent cannot be the 
result of misrepresentation, coercion, intimidation, deceit, fraud, or trickery. See Gouled v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921). Use of force, in any way, ordinarily vitiates the 
consent. A person in possession of property may give consent even if he or she is not the 
owner. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). This means the lessee usually has 
the sole right to consent to search. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961). 
If the property is abandoned, the owner or lessor may consent to the search. Abel v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 217, 225 (1960). Ordinarily, an employee's consent is binding on the employer. 
United States v. Buettner-Tanusch, 646 F.2d 759, 764-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 
(1981). 
1989] EPA ACCESS 29 
the official has several unpleasant alternatives. The inspector can 
simply abandon the attempt to inspect. Alternatively, he or she can 
assert that EPA has the right to conduct a warrantless search, and 
attempt to force his or her way onto the property.147 Finally, the 
inspector may leave the premises and return with a warrant and a 
United States Marshal to aid in gaining entry. 148 
Property owners may exercise the power, if not the right, to 
temporarily frustrate warrantless entry attempts. Frustrated at-
tempts to gain access by way of consent cost the government thou-
sands of dollars, especially in environmental programs where large 
numbers of searches are conducted daily. If the Agency intends to 
rely on consent to enter a particUlar property, it should obtain the 
consent, if possible, in writing, before going to the facility. Naturally, 
such preparatory measures are inappropriate where a surprise in-
spection is necessary or desirable. However, the government should 
strongly consider obtaining an ex parte warrant even in those cir-
cumstances. 149 
EPA should ordinarily secure a warrant when it intends to conduct 
an inspection of some duration, or whenever officials must remain 
on the property for an extended period of time. A consenting owner 
may attempt to revoke consent after EPA has entered and begun 
its inspection activities. While the legal validity of such revocations 
is subject to debate,150 as a practical matter the official may be forced 
to leave the premises and assert his rights in a legal forum. 151 Sub-
stantial investments of EPA officials' time and analytical effort 
should not be predicated on the legal vagaries of what constitutes 
valid consent or valid withdrawal of consent. The conservative and 
147 See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text regarding the use of self-help to gain 
access. 
148 See infra notes 154-77 and accompanying text regarding general warrant requirements. 
149 See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text regarding the Agency's use of ex parte 
warrants. 
150 Courts have differing views of consent revocation and the effectiveness of attempts to 
revoke consent. Compare Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States 
v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (ruling consent is revocable and revocation is legally 
effective to restrain governmental action) with United States v. Hezbrun, 723 F.2d 773 (11th 
Cir. 1984), United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980) and United States v. 
Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973) (viewing consent given in some instances to be 
irrevocable, and viewing attempted revocation as inoperative). The possibility that consent 
may be revoked is a reason why EPA will sometimes obtain a warrant rather than ask for an 
occupant's consent. The problems resulting from revoked consent are legally and logistically 
unacceptable. 
151 The official has the option of seeking a warrant or instituting an action for declaratory 
or injunctive relief. 
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prudent approach in such circumstances is to obtain an ex parte 
warrant. 
The foregoing discussions of search pursuant to consent and the 
pervasively regulated business exception to the warrant rule indicate 
that a major element of EPA access policy and strategy could be 
centered upon warrantless inspections and searches. While such a 
policy is legally tenable, EPA should not embrace it without a good 
deal of forethought and planning. If, for example, the Agency plans 
to make regular or predictable inspections of hazardous waste dis-
posal facilities or pesticide manufacturing plants, EPA should pre-
pare judicial test cases to establish that such enterprises are per-
vasively regulated. Establishing such a limited legal precedent, 
however, does not ensure the cooperation of all commercial owners 
or clear the way for unfettered use of the exception. The Agency 
would also have to establish that an EPA official has authority to 
use force to effectuate warrantless search rights. Unless self-help-
the privileged use of reasonable physical force to effectuate the entry 
and to preclude interference-is available, such a right to "warrant-
less" entry is wholly illusory. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, rather than establishing a firm 
right of self-help to effectuate warrantless entry, has intimated that 
the Agency must obtain a warrant or file a plenary suit for an 
injunction requiring the possessor to allow government personnel to 
enter if entry is refused. 152 Nevertheless, it is paradoxical for EPA 
to possess a warrantless right to enter property but be forced to 
resort to the judiciary to enforce that right. If a United States 
Marshal or deputy accompanies Agency personnel exercising war-
rantless entry rights, self-help for entry is theoretically available. 
However, it is extremely unlikely that a busy Marshal would lend 
such assistance unless EPA had a warrant in hand confirming the 
legality of the proposed entry and post-entry activities. 
152 See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 
596 (1981). Perhaps the Court had not analyz(!d the matter thoroughly. The Dewey decision 
intimated that self-help by forcible entry was not available under the statute analyzed, even 
though the statute provided for warrantless entry. 452 U.S. at 596-97. The result seems 
anomalous since the identical entry right, when confirmed by a warrant and served with the 
aid of a U.S. Marshal, could be exercised with reasonable force and self-help. The statute's 
warrantless entry provision seems to have added nothing to the already existing exception to 
the warrant requirement for entry pursuant to consent. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 
U.S. 307, 321-22 & n.18 (1978) the Supreme Court also implied that the Clean Air Act required 
EPA to resort to the federal courts if entry was refused. An early commentator on Barlow's 
flatly concluded that EPA's authorization statutes did not provide for self-help or forced entry. 
Martin, EPA and Administrative Inspections, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 123, 134--37 (1979). 
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Currently, in the absence of a clear authorization to use self-help, 
a warrantless search attempt based upon the "pervasively regulated" 
business exception is little more than a search pursuant to consent. 
If the industrial property is fenced, or access is limited in some other 
way, the property owner faced with an inspector without a warrant 
may have the power, if not the legal authority, to turn the inspector 
away. 
Broad-based use of consent and the pervasively regulated business 
exception to the warrant requirement create programmatic prob-
lems. Judicial pronouncements that clearly establish the use of self-
help and authorize warrantless searches of various industries would 
strengthen these access tools. In the meantime, EPA should rely 
upon searches pursuant to consent only in appropriate circum-
stances, or upon the pervasively regulated business exception to the 
warrant requirement, only if one of several conditions is present: (1) 
regulation of the industry in question has become routine, and the 
commercial operator expects and cooperates in periodic inspections; 
(2) access as a practical matter cannot be restrained or prevented 
by a property owner not consenting to the search (such as an over-
flight, walking through unfenced property, observing from off-prop-
erty); (3) the search will be of short duration and it is unlikely that 
consent will be refused; or (4) exigencies exist that make proceeding 
without an ex parte warrant necessary or desirable. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF EPA 
ACCESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESIGNING TECHNOLOGICAL 
CONTROLS FOR COMMERCIAL PROPERTY 
Practical as well as policy considerations illustrate the potential 
problems of conducting even a short-duration inspection without a 
warrant. Warrantless searches are much more likely to produce 
delays, induce costly litigation, and perhaps render the search a 
nullity. Regardless of the strength of EPA's argument in favor of a 
warrantless search, the Agency runs a much greater risk, acting 
without a warrant, that a court will find a fourth amendment viola-
tion and render the fruits of the search unusable in a compliance, 
enforcement, or rulemaking proceeding. 153 The entire investment in 
an inspection effort, including EPA inspectors' time, laboratory anal-
153 See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,209 (1946). The exclusionary 
rule renders illegally obtained evidence unusable in subsequent enforcement proceedings. 
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ysis, and test results, may hang in the balance if the Agency relies 
upon a warrantless inspection. 
A. Proceeding With a Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment: 
The Probable Cause and Reasonableness Requirements 
Access for the purposes of designing technology-based pollution 
control permits, or for implementing remedial measures, intrudes 
more substantially upon commercial interests than an inspection 
does. EPA is present on the property for longer periods than is 
required for the ordinary inspection. Therefore, when EPA utilizes 
its entry authority to address pollution control problems by attempt-
ing to engineer a technological cure, the Agency should usually arm 
itself with a warrant to avoid constitutional problems, delays, dis-
ruption, or possible withdrawal of consent. 
Simply stated, a warrant is a judicial confirmation of an official's 
authority to act in pursuit of statutory or other legal goals. 154 A 
warrant shields the official directed to complete the action from legal 
liability when acting pursuant to the dictates of the warrant. Any 
warrant sought by EPA will confirm the pre-existing rights of an 
Agency official to enter the target premises and to perform specified 
activities there. Most EPA administrative warrants verify the offi-
cial's authority to enter private premises and conduct post-entry 
activities such as inspections, sampling, or remedial activities. 
In a sense, the statutory right of entry or its equivalent gives 
EPA officials a "right to a warrant" whether or not the fourth 
amendment requires one for the proposed activity. 155 This feature is 
important because it prevents prolonged litigation in the event that 
the owner or occupier of the targeted premises asserts some claim. 156 
The warrant procedure interposes a neutral judicial arbitrator 
between the official claiming to have authority to act and the private 
citizen who will suffer the intrusion upon his property or privacy 
154 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1756 (4th ed. 1968). 
155 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 
1280 (9th Cir. 1981); Midwest Growers Coop. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1976); see 
also infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
156 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Offices of Lakeside Non-Ferrous Metals, 
Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1982); Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM, 673 F.2d 
1045 (9th Cir. 1982). Each mentions the loss of immunity when no warrant is held by the 
governmental official. Properly utilized, the warrant rules from Barlow's are a genuine aid 
and benefit to officials engaged in entry and post-access activities pursuant to a substantive 
right or power conferred by statute or common law. Viewed in that manner, an official has a 
"right" to such a warrant when a relevant statute grants a right of entry upon his agency. 
The official is entitled to the immunity and protection that a warrant affords. 
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interests. 157 A warrant only obligates the target to allow the search; 
he or she need not otherwise facilitate the search or other post-entry 
activities. Nevertheless, administrative warrants are not limited to 
searches or seizures, but are capable of authorizing many forms of 
activity on commercial' property. 158 
Most of the recent Supreme Court decisions governing adminis-
trative access to commercial property have dealt with the constitu-
tionality of warrantless administrative searches. Judicial guidelines 
for searches conducted pursuant to administrative warrants must 
therefore be derived from older Supreme Court cases, the interstitial 
statements made in recent Supreme Court cases dealing with war-
rantless administrative searches, and lower court decisions. The 
reasonableness of the government's actions remains the ultimate 
constitutional standard. 159 
In addressing the requirements for probable cause and warrants 
under the fourth amendment, courts often examine the access pro-
visions of the statutes being relied upon by the government. For 
example, the Supreme Court in 1946 held that the requirement of 
probable cause is satisfied "by the court's determination that the 
investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress 
can order, and the [objects of the search] are relevant to the in-
quiry. "160 The Court in later years gradually moved to linking the 
probable cause issue to the existence of an authorizing statute and 
the overall reasonableness of the search. 161 
Eventually, in 1978, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case 
of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ,162 which involved the constitutionality 
of inspection provisions contained in the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration's (OSHA) authorization act. 163 The Court 
157 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963). 
158 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Both the Supreme Court's opinion 
on the breadth of EPA's authority to conduct activity on commercial property in Dow Chemical 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), analyzed supra notes 31-89 and accompanying 
text, and the district court opinion in Public Servo Co. of Indiana v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720 
(S.D. Ind. 1981), illustrate the range of activity allowed, both with and without a warrant. 
159 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981). In Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the governmental action in question must meet the reasonable goals 
of the statute. 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967). 
160 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,209 (1946). 
161 See, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599. This perhaps confuses two constitutional tests for 
one. See Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1297 & n.39 
(1979). At best the reasoning is circular. 
162 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
163 [d. at 320 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 538). Barlow's is the descendant of a number of 
cases, the most notable of which are Camara and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), 
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struck down the OSHA statute, but only to the extent to which the 
law purported to authorize OSHA inspectors to use self-help to enter 
commercial facilities in the teeth of an occupant's objection and to 
proceed with warrantless inspections. 164 The Court affirmed OSHA's 
authority to enter premises. In doing so, however, the Court im-
posed a warrant requirement through its interpretation of the fourth 
amendment. 165 Because OSHA regulates nearly all commercial op-
erations and does not "pervasively regulate" any particular industry, 
the Court found no constitutionally acceptable exception to the war-
rant requirement. Therefore, it ruled OSHA had to first obtain a 
judicially issued warrant or its functional equivalent. 166 
In a major decision highlighting the differences between criminal 
and administrative searches, the Court discussed the elements that 
a federal agency must show to obtain a civil or "administrative" 
warrant for compliance investigations. The Court held that an ad-
ministrative agency had to show either: (1) that reasonable cause 
existed to believe that a violation or other circumstance targeted by 
statute had occurred or was occurring at the facility to be entered; 
or (2) that the facility to be entered was identified and selected by 
the Agency based on an administrative plan or scheme for entries 
prepared before the warrant was applied for, and that the plan or 
strategy was derived from "neutral sources."167 The Court did not 
require that the "plan" or "scheme" itself be "neutral" or random, 
only that the basis for the plan be "neutral. "168 
decided the same day. For an excellent discussion of these cases in the environmental law 
context, see Case Note, Administrative Inspections/rom Above: Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 361, 372-74 (1987). Justice White wrote 
all of these opinions. Some believe Camara portrays the struggle by the Court to articulate 
an acceptable analytical basis for administrative warrant cases, finally resulting in Barlow's. 
The rationale of the earlier cases should not be overlooked, but they must be interpreted in 
light of Justice White's Barlow's opinion. Also, one must recognize that during the last two 
weeks of May 1978, the Supreme Court handed down the Barlow's opinion and Zurcher v. 
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), authored by Justice White, as well as Michigan v. Tyler, 
436 U.S. 499 (1978). This is significant because it shows that all three cases involved the in-
depth consideration of warrant problems by the same nine justices in the same term. The 
results, therefore, of those decisions must be regarded as thoroughly considered by the same 
Court. 
;64 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978). 
165Id. at 315-20. 
166 Id. at 323-25. 
167Id. at 320-22. 
168 Id. Some courts identify in Barlow's a supposed third basis, consisting of a showing that 
there exist, for a particular facility, "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting an ... inspection" and that these have been satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 723 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1984). This test is only a subset of, or 
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The Barlow's Court emphatically stated that the fourth amend-
ment "criminal probable cause" was inapplicable: 
Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For 
purposes of an administrative search ... probable cause justi-
fying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific 
evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that 
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conduct-
ing an . . . inspection are satisfied. "169 
The Barlow's Court further explained that a warrant based on prob-
able cause would "provide assurances from a neutral officer that the 
inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by 
statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific 
neutral criteria. "170 
Many environmental statutes contain provisions expressly author-
izing the EPA Administrator and his or her "authorized represen-
tatives" to enter a facility and to conduct inspections or remedial 
activities after entry without explicitly requiring a warrant.171 No 
one has yet successfully challenged EPA's statutory authority on the 
constitutional grounds raised in Barlow's, or succeeded in interpos-
ing that case's administrative warrant requirements upon EPA ac-
tivities. Litigants have urged crabbed interpretations of the statu-
tory language itself. For example, companies have asserted, with 
mixed success, that "authorized representatives" of EPA, referred 
to in several environmental statutes, means only federal officials. 
Therefore, industry contends that EPA may not contract with a 
private company to conduct inspections for EPA. 172 
a matter subsumed by, the "administrative scheme" basis for warrant issuance and is not an 
independent requirement. 
169 436 U.S. at 320. Commentators may argue that the Barlow's statement about probable 
cause did not imply that the fourth amendment's probable cause language was inapplicable 
to administrative warrants, and that it only attached to criminal warrants under Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 41 or warrants where the predominant institutional purpose is to seek 
evidence of criminal rather than merely "illegal" activity. Some argue that the Court did not 
really say that, but instead meant that while the "probable cause" language in the fourth 
amendment does in fact apply, the meaning of "probable cause" was diluted to a level of 
"reasonable cause" or "administrative cause." In practical effect, the result is the same. See 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
170 436 U.S. at 323. 
171 See supra note 4. 
172 Compare Bunker Hill Co. Lead and Zinc Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(contractor allowed) with Stauffer Chern. Co. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981) (con-
tractor not authorized representative); see also United States v. Stauffer Chern. Co., 464 U.S. 
165 (1984) (collateral estoppel case). 
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While not conceding the point, EPA conducts its inspection pro-
grams as if the administrative warrant rules announced in Barlow's 
applied in most instances to EPA under various environmental stat-
utes. 173 By properly refusing to concede that Barlow's controls EPA's 
rights under all the different statutes it administers, the Agency 
retains the flexibility of asserting that a warrantless search is valid 
in appropriate cases. 174 
An EPA official conducting a search, with or without a warrant, 
is asserting a statutory right to be on the premises. That right cannot 
be conditioned by the owner or operator insisting that EPA officials 
sign secrecy agreements, waivers of liability, voluntary restrictions 
on access, or hold harmless agreements. While the Department of 
Justice will not allow EPA officials to enter such agreements, in-
spectors often wear protective gear or split samples at the request 
of the owner. 
EPA's reasons for ordinarily following Barlow's warrant principles 
are practical. It is easier and more cost-effective to obtain a warrant 
than it is to litigate. Furthermore, EPA officials clearly have the 
right to obtain warrants provided for in the Barlow's decision even 
if in a particular case or under a particular statute they might not 
be constitutionally required to do SO.175 Since warrants afford sub-
stantial legal protection to governmental officials from private suits 
for damages, sound policy suggests that they are good insurance 
policies, obtainable ex parte. 176 
One important element links the Barlow's decision with its pred-
ecessor and successor judicial decisions regarding the constitution-
ality of administrative search activity. All three eras emphasize the 
crucial role that the statutory authorization plays in the constitu-
tional analysis. While the Supreme Court decisions after Barlow's 
may be criticized for allowing Congress to, in effect, partially control 
what is considered constitutionally reasonable, statutory interpre-
tation of the precise statute involved remains the key to any admin-
istrative search case. Many similarities in environmental access pro-
visions exist. 177 Therefore, the detailed examination of the Clean Air 
Act, Clean Water Act, and Superfund access authorities contained 
in this Article will illustrate most of the relevant constitutional, 
173 One decision indicates that EPA is required to observe the Barlow's ruling. Public Servo 
Co. of Indiana v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind. 1981). 
174 See supra notes 4, 83-89 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. 
176 [d. 
177 See supra note 4. 
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statutory, and policy considerations governing EPA access pursuant 
to a warrant. 
B. Illustrative Case of Proceeding With a Warrant: Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. EPA178 
Technology is at the very heart of the Clean Water Act's179 pro-
grams to reduce or eliminate water pollution discharges from our 
nation's point sources. ISO By July 1, 1977, all point source dischar-
gers, except publicly owned treatment facilities, were to have 
achieved compliance with designated effluent limitations through the 
installation of the "best practicable technology currently available" 
(BPT).lsl Such dischargers were then to install the "best available 
technology economically achievable" (BAT) to control the release of 
toxicants and other pollutants no later than July 1, 1983. 1S2 Attain-
ment of these technological requirements was designed to move 
industry closer to the ultimate goal of the Clean Water Act, which 
is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological 
integrity of the Nation's waters."IS3 
The history of EPA's attempt to develop BPT and BAT effluent 
limitations is scarred by lengthy delays; much of industry did not 
meet the 1977 deadline for compliance with BPT, let alone the 1983 
deadline for BAT.lS4 Congress grossly underestimated the sheer vol-
ume of information that was required for the Agency to make an 
intelligent evaluation of what constituted BPT or BAT for numerous 
industrial categories,ls5 including oil refineries. The Mobil litigation 
was sparked by efforts of EPA's regional office in Chicago to gain 
information about oil refinery waste streams that might be useful in 
the development of BAT limitations for toxic discharges. 
178 716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984). 
179 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (1986 & West Supp. 1989). 
180 "Point source" is a specific point of origin of a discharge containing a pollutant and is 
distinguished from such non-point sources of pollution as surface water runoff after a rain-
storm. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). 
'" 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1982). 
"" Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
18" I d. § 1251. 
184 Kalur, Will Judicial Error Allow Industrial Point Sources to Avoid BPT and Perhaps 
BAT Later? A Story of Good Intentions, Bad Dictum, and Ugly Ecology, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
955-88 (1979). This article examines in detail the history, judicial approval, and application of 
BPT variance regulations and argues that congressional action is required to prevent further 
delays in pollution control. 
185 See id. 
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Mobil Oil Corporation operates a typical petroleum refinery in 
Channahon, Illinois, near the Des Plaines River, a navigable 
water.186 Mobil Oil channels its internal process and waste streams 
from its refinery to a facility that treats the waste prior to discharge. 
That facility operates under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permit issued to Mobil by the Illinois 
EPA.187 Mobi1's permit limits the amount of conventional pollutants 
that it may discharge into the Des Plaines River, and requires Mobil 
to monitor the amount of pollutants it dumps into the river by 
regularly testing samples from the refinery's waste streams "taken 
at a point representative of discharge" into the river. 188 
EPA requested access to the facility for the purpose of obtaining 
information that might later be used in the development of effluent 
limitations for toxicants that require the application of BAT, and to 
monitor Mobil Oil's compliance status. 189 BAT sometimes requires 
the design and installation of technological controls on individual 
process equipment within the plant. Therefore, EPA sought infor-
mation about the existence of toxic pollutants in Mobi1's internal 
waste streams, prior to the point of treatment, in furtherance of 
EPA's obligation to promulgate BAT limitations. 19o 
Mobil granted EPA permission to take samples of the treated 
waste stream at the point of discharge, but refused to allow sampling 
of its internal process waste streams. 191 EPA obtained an ex parte 
administrative warrant from a federal magistrate, and subsequently 
conducted an inspection and sampling program at the Mobil site. 
Mobil's efforts before a magistrate to quash the warrant were un-
successful, as were its efforts to overturn the magistrate's decision 
in the federal district court. 192 Mobil then appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, raising a number of challenges to EPA's 
statutory authority to sample internal waste streams. 
Mobil directed two surgical strikes at the broad statutory provi-
sions upon which EPA based its authority to enter and sample 
186 Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187, 1188 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 
(1984). 
187Id. Illinois has been delegated the authority to administer the NPDES permit program. 
Id. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. at 1188, 1190. 
190 I d. at 1190. 
191 I d. at 1188. 
192Id. 
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internal waste streams. 193 First, Mobil claimed that the term "ef-
fluent," as used in the statute, referred only to the waste stream 
that was treated and eventually discharged into the Des Plaines 
River. 194 Second, because Mobil's permit required it to sample the 
treated effluent at the point of discharge, the company asserted that 
EPA was limited to sampling only at that point,195 based on the final 
sentence of Clean Water Act section 308. At the lower court level, 
Mobil also raised a constitutional challenge to EPA's actions insisting 
that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 196 
193 Mobil challenged EPA's authority to test untreated wastewater under section 308 of the 
Clean Water Act. [d. at 1188-89. Section 308 provides: 
(a) Whenever required to carry out the objective of this chapter, including but not 
limited to (1) developing or assisting in the development of any effluent limitation, 
or other limitation, prohibition, or effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or 
standard of performance under this chapter; (2) determining whether any person is 
in violation of any such effluent limitation, or other limitation, prohibition or effluent 
standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance; (3) any requirement 
established under this section; or (4) carrying out sections 1315, 1321, 1342, 1344 
(relating to State permit programs), and 1364 of this title -
(A) the Administrator shall require the owner or operator of any point source to 
(i) establish and maintain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install, use, and 
maintain such monitoring equipment or methods (including where appropriate, bio-
logical monitoring methods), (iv) sample such effluents (in accordance with such 
methods, at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the Administrator 
shall prescribe), and (v) provide such other information as he may reasonably require; 
and 
(B) the Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation of his 
credentials -
(i) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent 
source is located or in which any records required to be maintained under clause (A) 
of this subsection are located, and 
(ii) may at reasonable times have access to any copy and records, inspect any 
monitoring equipment or method required under clause (A), and sample any effluent 
which the owner or operator of such source is required to sample under such clause. 
33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982). 
194 Mobil, 716 F.2d at 1189. 
195 Mobil based this assertion on the final sentence of section 308, supra note 193. In fact, 
the permit also required Mobil Oil to conduct periodic sampling of its various wastewater 
streams "at a point representative of [the] discharge" but "prior to mixing with other effluent 
streams" or "prior to its combination with the process water." Mobil Oil's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Appendix 18a-26a, Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984). 
196 Mobil had contended to the district court that the proposed search was unreasonable 
under the fourth amendment. The court of appeals did not specifically address the fourth 
amendment issue, which was apparently abandoned on appeal. Mobil Oil unsuccessfully tried 
to resuscitate the issue in its Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 
Mobil Oil's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix 18a-26a, Mobil Oil Corp. v.EPA, 716 
F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984). 
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The Court of Appeals easily disposed of these arguments, brushing 
aside the fourth amendment question. Implicitly finding that the 
Barlow's criteria were met, the court held that a traditional balanc-
ing of governmental interests against Mobil's interest in preventing 
the intrusion supported the reasonableness of the search. 197 In 
strongly worded language, the court stated that it had difficulty in 
finding any substantial industrial interest whatsoever in preventing 
the search. 
It appears, then, that the only interest Mobil could possibly have 
in preventing EPA officials from sampling its untreated waste-
water is that Mobil might want to keep the EPA in the dark as 
much as possible about what pollutants are present in the water 
it dumps into the Des Plaines River and about how efficient its 
treatment processes are at cleaning its wastewater of pollu-
tants.198 
The Court of Appeals also noted that the sampling program was 
only a minor disruption of daily corporate activity.199 Although the 
Supreme Court refused to grant Mobil's request for review of the 
decision,20o the Dow overflight case leaves little doubt that the high 
court would have upheld the Mobil decision against a fourth amend-
ment challenge. The dissent in Dow condemned the overflight as 
unconstitutionally unreasonable primarily because it was performed 
without a warrant;201 a unanimous Court, however, found that the 
overflight was authorized by the Clean Air Act, even though the 
statute did not expressly mention aerial photography.202 Therefore, 
it is unlikely that even the Dow minority would have found problems 
in Mobil since EPA obtained a warrant. 
The Court of Appeals similarly rejected Mobil's statutory argu-
ments, which seemed to run contrary to the express language and 
intent of the access provisions of the statute. The court emphasized, 
as the Agency did, that section 308 allowed effluents to be sampled 
"at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the 
Administrator shall prescribe. "203 The regulations implementing sec-
tion 308 inspections also undercut Mobil's argument that EPA could 
197 716 F.2d at 1190. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. The disruption issue is extremely important to access policy and will be dealt with 
infra notes 258-59, 268-83, 327-61 and accompanying text. 
200 466 U.S. 980 (1984). 
201 Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 252 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
202Id. at 234, 244 n.8; see also supra notes 31-82 and accompanying text. 
203 Mobil, 716 F.2d at 1190-91; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(A) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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sample only at the "end-of-the-pipe" discharge point. Regulations in 
effect at the time of the inspection provided that "the permittee shall 
allow the Director [of the EPA program] ... to ... sample or 
monitor at reasonable times, for the purposes of assuring permit 
compliance or as otherwise authorized by the appropriate Act, any 
substances or parameters at any location. "204 
Similarly, the court found untenable Mobil's effort to define ef-
fluent in such a way as to exclude internal waste streams. 205 The 
term "effluent" is not defined in the Clean Water Act or in the 
implementing regulations. The courts will give an undefined statu-
tory term its plain and ordinary meaning whenever possible.206 The 
ordinary meaning of effluent, and the one adopted by both EPA and 
the court, is "something that flows out. "207 Thus, the untreated waste 
streams that flowed from Mobil Oil's production processes were 
"effluents" within the meaning of the Act. The court's decision in 
this regard reflects the great deference that is accorded an agency's 
interpretation of a statute which it administers. 208 
204 40 C.F.R. § 122.7(i)(4) (1982) (emphasis added). 
205 Mobil argued in its brief that the definition of effluent should be extrapolated from the 
definition of "effluent limitation" contained in section 502(11), and thus be limited to that which 
is "discharged from point sources into navigable waters." Brief for Appellant at 3, Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1983) (No. 83-1047). That interpretation of the defini-
tional section of the Act is unsupportable when viewed in light of the express statutory 
language of section 308, which indicates that sampling of effluent may take place at "such 
locations" as the Administrator shall prescribe. 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982). If Mobil's position 
were adopted, the phrase "at such location" would be superfluous since the only possible 
sampling location would be at the discharge point. Mobil's claim is similar to an assertion that 
the term "automotive exhaust" must be defined solely by reference to the phrase "exhaust 
pipe." Obviously, exhaust is created by an engine and constitutes exhaust prior to its discharge 
from the automobile at the end of the pipe. Moreover, much can be learned about the control 
of automotive exhaust by analyzing its temperature, chemical composition, and other physical 
properties before it reaches the end of the pipe and is discharged to the ambient air. An 
analogous conclusion with respect to effluent is reached in Mobil. See 716 F.2d 1187, 1190 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
206 See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); Helvering v. City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator 
Co., 287 U.S. 77,83 (1932). 
207 See Mobil, 716 F.2d at 1189. 
208 See id. at 1189-90. The Supreme Court has held that great deference must be given 
EPA's interpretation of Clean Water Act provisions, such as the Agency's interpretation of 
the term "effluent." See, e.g., E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134-
36 (1977). Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved in favor of the Agency's interpre-
tation. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized EPA's unique experience and expertise in 
administering this complex and technical statute. Thus, if the Agency's interpretation is 
reasonable, the courts must accept it. See, e.g., id.; Train v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965); Chevron, U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. 
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C. Implications of the Mobil Case for Clean Water Act 
Enforcement and Compliance Policy 
1. Enforcement of the Clean Water Act 
EPA's Clean Water Act enforcement program depends upon vig-
orous and expansive access and inspection activities. The Clean 
Water Act's provisions are broadly designed to "restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters. "209 Congress therefore enacted a comprehensive compliance 
and enforcement scheme in furtherance of this goal. The Act em-
powers EPA to (1) prevent or respond to spills of pollutants; (2) fund 
construction and improvement of sewage treatment facilities; and (3) 
control industrial point source discharges. 21o Section 308 grants the 
only entry and inspection authority that EPA can utilize to meet 
these various obligations. Mobil's interpretation would make EPA's 
compliance and enforcement programs impossible to implement. 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected similar attempts to nar-
row EPA's access and inspection authority under the Clean Air Act 
in the Dow overflight case. 211 The Court warned the business com-
munity that EPA's investigatory and enforcement authorities in both 
clean air and clean water matters were to be interpreted broadly, 
and that Congress was not required to "precisely spell out" how 
access authority was to be exercised in myriad commercial set-
tings. 212 
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) (deference given to administrative practice even though 
only justified after court challenge). An illustrative case similar to Mobil is National Wildlife 
Federation v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1311 (D.D.C. 1982). The issue in that case was 
whether low dissolved oxygen levels and waters supersaturated with oxygen discharged from 
a dam/reservoir facility to navigable waters are additions of "pollutants" to navigable waters 
and thereby requires an NPDES permit. EPA determined that these discharges were not 
point sources of pollution. The district court disagreed but, the circuit court reversed and 
held that EPA's interpretation of the Act was entitled to great deference. 693 F.2d 156, 166-
70 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court concluded that its inquiry is a limited one where an agency's 
construction neither contradicts the language of the implementing statute nor frustrates 
congressional policy. Id. at 171. "The agency's [decision] must be upheld if, in light of the 
appropriate degree of deference, it is sufficiently reasonable, even if it is not the only reason-
able one or even the reading the Court would have reached on its own." Id. (emphasis added). 
209 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The theories presented in the text accom-
panying infra notes 213-29 are taken directly from the original draft of the Appellee's brief 
prepared by the author of this Article for presentation before the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the Mobil case. 
210Id. §§ 1251-1376. 
211 See Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); see also supra notes 31-82 
and accompanying text. 
212 476 U.S. at 233. 
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The narrow interpretations urged by Mobil would do vastly more 
damage to enforcement efforts under the Clean Water Act than the 
prohibition on warrantless overflights would have done to Clean Air 
Act enforcement efforts. Such interpretations would negate and ren-
der meaningless many critical enforcement provisions of the Clean 
Water Act, in clear contravention of well-established principles of 
statutory construction. Statutes must be read as a whole. 213 For 
example, section 308's access and inspection provisions explicitly 
apply to spills of oil or hazardous substances governed by section 
311 of the Act. 214 In conducting the spill prevention and counter-
measure program pursuant to section 311 of the Act, EPA must be 
able to enter premises and sample effluents immediately to react 
effectively when a spill occurs. Under Mobil's reading of section 308, 
this would be impossible. EPA would be under a duty to first require 
the owner to sample the effluent before collecting a sample itself. 
Such delay in the Agency's response to a spill situation obviously 
contravenes section 311's language and intent. 
Similarly, the Agency must respond without delay to willful vio-
lations of the Clean Water Act. Under such circumstances, the 
Agency must have the ability under section 308 to obtain effluent 
data without prior recourse to owners or operators. 215 The need to 
avoid delay and prevent concealment of evidence has led the courts 
to sustain EPA's reliance on ex parte warrants for administrative 
searches. As stated by the court in United States v. Stauffer Chem-
ical CO.:216 "an affected business had the opportunity for an adver-
sary hearing ... it could temporarily shift its plant into compliance 
. . . only to return to polluting after termination of the inspection. 
Such activity would undermine EPA's enforcement power."217 Courts 
have gone so far as to uphold ex parte warrants even where surprise 
is nonessential to the success of the inspection. 218 
By the same token, ex parte applications may not be turned into 
adversarial contests by allowing target companies to intervene. 219 
213 See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940). 
214 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) 
215 See id. § 1319. 
216 511 F. Supp. 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 
1982), afl'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984). 
217Id. at 749-50. 
218 See, e.g., Bunker Hill Co. Lead and Zinc Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 
1981); Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1980) (agency need not 
demonstrate that surprise is necessary before ex parte warrant issues). 
219 In re Worksite Inspection of S.D. Warren, 481 F. Supp. 491 (D. Me. 1979); Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. Donovan, 540 F. Supp. 222 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (ex parte warrants proceed without 
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Ex parte proceedings to obtain warrants are consistent with proce-
dural and substantive due process, although challenges based on the 
due process clause are common. 220 
Tactically, defense lawyers look for opportunities to assert that 
their clients should be entitled to contest the issuance of ex parte 
warrants, hoping to turn warrant applications into wholesale adver-
sarial proceedings and buying their clients valuable time. 221 The 
Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily222 now stands 
in the defense lawyers' path. The Court endorsed the use of warrants 
to obtain documents and to proceed with searches of premises be-
lieved to contain evidence, even though the occupant of the premise 
was not a suspect. 223 The Court indicated its strong preference for 
warrants granted ex parte over the adversarial proceedings that a 
request for a subpoena would entail. 224 
Other unreasonable and unnecessary burdens would be placed on 
Agency efforts to enforce the Clean Water Act had Mobil's view 
prevailed. A crabbed interpretation of the term "effluent" would 
render other provisions of the Clean Water Act nonsensical. For 
instance, in section 402(b)(8) of the Act, the term effluent refers to 
pollutants being discharged to a publicly owned treatment works 
intervention by other parties). It has also been ruled that it is not within a magistrate's 
discretion to allow a non-party to intervene in Agency warrant application proceedings com-
menced ex parte. The court in S.D. Warren stated that "an adversary proceeding ... could 
only result in an unreasonable and unnecessary burden." 481 F. Supp. at 495. 
220 See Bunker Hill, 658 F.2d at 1285; see also B & B Chern. Co. v. EPA, 806 F.2d 987 
(11th Cir. 1986). If ex parte proceeding in this context were ruled unconstitutional, then 
hitherto well-established constitutionality of the ex parte criminal warrant proceedings under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 would be undermined. 
221Id. 
222436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
223 I d. at 560. 
224 See id. at 561; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 
(1985); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Donovan, 540 F. Supp. 222 (M.D. Pa. 1982); In re Worksite 
Inspection of S.D. Warren, 481 F. Supp. 491 (D. Me. 1979). 
The district court in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. 111.), rev'd, 
773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), straightforwardly rejected arguments that due process and other 
constitutional provisions required adversarial proceedings in CERCLA cases. It "assumed" 
arguendo that the administrative warrant issued there did involve a constitutional "taking," 
but went on to rule that because "just compensation" need not precede any such taking, see 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), and because the Tucker Act United States 
Claims Court remedies, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1982), would be available to the warrant 
respondent for anything the warrant validly authorized, no "due process" substantive require-
ment was violated by ex parte warrant issuance. The Riverside decision displays the correct-
ness of that view. The APA in 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982 & Supp. v 1987) requires that there be 
no other adequate remedy in a court before a deprivation such as a taking may be subjected 
to "early" judicial review under the APA. 
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(POTW), rather than to a navigable water.225 Effluents which are 
introduced into a POTW by an industrial user of the POTW are not 
considered "point source discharges" within the meaning of that 
term. Nonetheless, section 402(b)(9) specifically requires that indus-
trial dischargers to POTW s comply with section 308 of the Act.226 
In addition, section 308 expressly provides for inspections, monitor-
ing, and sampling as necessary to develop pretreatment standards 
pursuant to section 307.227 Pretreatment also refers to discharges to 
POTWs, not navigable waters. Obviously, a dogmatic insistence that 
"effluent" be narrowly defined as a point source discharge to navig-
able waters is diametrically opposed to these sections of the Act. 
2. Permits, Technology, and EPA Access Policy 
The most important policy underpinning for a broad construction 
of EPA's access and sampling authority under the Clean Water Act 
is the technology-forcing nature of the Act. As stated previously, 
section 308 specifically states that the purpose of the inspection and 
sampling authority is to "carry out the objectives of this [Act], 
including but not limited to . . . developing or assisting in the 
development of any effluent limitation, or other limitation, prohibi-
tion, or effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of 
performance under this [Act]."228 
Sampling of internal waste streams is essential to the development 
of technology-based effluent limitations and other pollution control 
requirements contained in NPDES permits issued under section 402 
of the Act. 229 Pursuant to sections 301 and 304 of the Act, EPA must 
establish effluent limitations that are achievable through the appli-
cation of the best available technology economically achievable (BAT) 
for a given category or class of dischargers. 230 
The Agency must consider several factors set out in section 304 
of the Act in determining what constitutes BAT for the control of 
pollution discharges from a particular facility or class of industrial 
facilities. These factors include the age of the equipment and facilities 
involved, the process employed, and the engineering requirements 
of designing various types of control technologies. 231 In addition, 
225 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(8) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
226 [d. § 1342(b)(9). 
227 [d. § 1317. 
228 [d. § 1318(a). 
229 [d. § 1342. 
230 [d. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(A)-(B). 
231 [d. § 1314(b)(2)(B). 
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EPA also must consider the total cost of the technology in relation 
to the effluent reduction achievable by the application of such tech-
nology.232 This requires a thorough evaluation of the cost and effi-
ciency of the treatment technology to be employed. Therefore, in 
developing BAT effluent limitation guidelines, EPA must study in-
ternal waste streams to ascertain what types of treatment units are 
needed and what the most efficient placement of the treatment units 
is.233 
To evaluate the degree of pollutant reduction achievable by the 
system, EPA must know what goes into a treatment system. In 
some instances, it may be more practical and economical to treat 
pollutants in an isolated internal waste stream than to wait until 
that stream has combined with other waste streams prior to ultimate 
discharge to a navigable water. 
In addition to developing national effluent limitations guidelines, 
the NPDES permitting agency also has the authority to impose 
additional permit conditions necessary to achieve compliance with 
the requirements of the Act at a particular plant. 234 EPA uses this 
authority where national effluent limitations do not address pollutant 
problems unique to a given facility or group of facilities. 
For example, toxicants diluted or combined with uncontaminated 
cooling water or other process wastes can remain undetected at the 
ultimate point of discharge. Dilution occurs when the volume of the 
final effluent at the discharge point is so great that a particular 
pollutant is present in concentrations which, while below the detec-
tion levels of the analytical testing equipment and procedures, may 
still represent a significant level of pollution. In addition, the com-
plexity of final effluent streams at the ultimate discharge point may 
be such that a toxic pollutant will not be discovered using standard 
analytical methods. Thus, the masked pollutant may escape detection 
and be discharged directly to the environment. Congress has given 
EPA broad authority to sample internal effluents in order to effec-
tively address such situations and thereby prevent pollutants from 
being discharged. 235 Naturally, a cramped definition of effluent would 
severely undercut EPA's ability to develop plant-specific permit con-
ditions. 
232Id. 
233 See id. 
234 Id. § 1342(a)(lHa)(2) (1982). 
235 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 
U.S. 980 (1984). 
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The policy considerations supporting unfettered access to com-
mercial property under the Clean Water Act are tempered somewhat 
by countervailing privacy concerns. These countervailing concerns 
can be met, without unnecessarily curtailing access, by implemen-
tation of rigorous procedural safeguards for commercial interests. 
D. Privacy Interests and Countervailing Policy Considerations of 
Broad Access 
Industrial trade secrets constitute the most substantial privacy 
interests that must be accounted for when performing the fourth 
amendment balancing of the government's need for entry and in-
spection and industry's right to be free of untoward intrusion. 236 
Once in possession of process information, effluent data, or chemical 
formulae which are not protected by copyright or patent law, a 
competitor is often capable of duplicating the trade secrets of others 
in the same industry, without incurring the associated research and 
development costS. 237 Reverse engineering and outright piracy may 
impede economic growth resulting from innovation and competition. 
Therefore, the government must prevent unnecessary disclosures of 
trade secrets from becoming a by-product of EPA access to com-
mercial property. 
To protect these valid interests, EPA has promulgated compre-
hensive regulations designed to prevent public disclosure of confi-
dential business information (CBI) obtained by the Agency.238 The 
rules include special provisions governing information obtained un-
der specific environmental statutes. 239 State agencies and contractors 
working under delegation agreements or contractual obligations are 
236 For a discussion of the trade secret issue raised in the context of Clean Air Act compli-
ance, see supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text. 
237 See, e.g., Chevron Chern. Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1981). For example, piracy 
of microelectronic semi-conductors became such a problem that specific legislation was enacted 
to supplement existing patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret laws. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-
14 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). For a discussion of the use of aerial surveillance in industrial 
espionage, see E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971). 
238 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.201-.311 (1988). For an informative discussion of the issue surrounding 
Agency access to trade secrets, see Comment, Protection for Trade Secrets under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act of 1976, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 329 (1980); McGarity & Shapiro, The 
Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure 
Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980). 
239 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.302-.311 (1988) contains special rules for information obtained under the 
Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, RCRAICERCLA, FIFRA, and TSCA, as 
well as other statutes. 
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bound by the same duties relative to nondisclosure of CBI. 240 The 
most elaborate and protective regulatory framework governs CBI 
submitted by chemical manufacturers pursuant to TSCA.241 Willful 
violations of provisions designed to prevent disclosure of CBI are 
potentially punishable by criminal prosecution. 242 
EPA can prevent these legitimate privacy interests from becoming 
major impediments to an effective access policy only by adhering to 
CBI procedures. The Agency must consistently afford industry the 
right to assert a claim of confidentiality with respect to information 
obtained during inspection and sampling programs, and always fol-
low the regulatory procedures for classifying the information as 
confidential or nonconfidential. Assiduous compliance with existing 
CBI regulations is good policy. It prevents industry from building 
the case that release of trade secrets and proprietary information to 
the government is tantamount to release to competitors or the pub-
lic. It also protects legitimate privacy interests in safeguarding trade 
secrets and preserving research and development investments. 
One problematic issue remains. If "emission data" under the Clean 
Air Act or "effluent data" under the Clean Water Act are defined 
broadly, as the Mobil court suggests, potential trade secret issues 
arise. 243 For example, the Clean Water Act requires that all "effluent 
data" be made public244 so that citizens are apprised of the pollutants 
that may reach the waterways, and thus may effectively participate 
in public hearings and other proceedings that lead to the issuance of 
NPDES permits, effluent guidelines, and water quality standards. 245 
The litigation involving EPA's attempt to obtain information re-
garding certain chemical processes and waste streams at Dow's Mid-
land, Michigan, facility highlighted these issues. EPA sought access 
to assist the State of Michigan in the development of a BAT permit. 246 
Dow asserted that existing CBI protection for "effluent data" was 
inadequate, and that release of information regarding certain chem-
ical catalysts would jeopardize its competitive position. 247 
240 40 C.F.R. § 2.211(d) (1988). 
241Id. § 2.306. See generally id. §§ 2.201-.311, 720.80-.95. 
242 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982). 
243 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1983), cen. denied, 466 
U.S. 980 (1984). 
244 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (1982) (supplier of records, reports, or information may claim 
confidentiality for trade secrets; however, effluent data must be made public); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 2.302(e) (1988). 
245 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1982). 
246 United States v. Dow Chern. Co., Civ. No. 83-CV 7011 BC (E.D. Mich. 1983) (complaint 
by United States; answer by Dow). 
247Id. 
1989] EPA ACCESS 49 
The Dow litigation was settled, after years of negotiation, with an 
elaborate judicial consent decree that established a mechanism for 
prompt judicial review of any adverse Agency determination on the 
CBI issue.248 Under the consent decree, EPA obtained the process 
information it needed, and preserved the regulatory process for 
making final confidentiality determinations.249 However, the dilemma 
created by making select emission or effluent data, that would or-
dinarily be CBI, available to the public under the environmental law 
was not resolved. The public's legitimate interest in knowing what 
pollutants may enter the environment collides with industry's legit-
imate interest in safeguarding research and development by keeping 
trade secrets confidential. The government's primary interest in the 
information is satisfied as long as the information is available to it 
and state agencies charged with developing permits, water quality 
standards, effluent limitations, and similar requirements. Thus, a 
statutory amendment, allowing the government to obtain access and 
to use narrowly defined categories of confidential effluent or emission 
data without releasing such information to the public, is justified. 
The CBI regulations already attempt to lessen the impact of this 
dilemma by exempting from public disclosure certain "effluent data," 
such as research and development information and new product 
information, beyond the extent necessary to "disclose publicly that 
a source is (or is not) in compliance with an applicable standard or 
limitation. "250 A statutory amendment, patterned after this regula-
tory exemption, that prohibits public disclosure of effluent data al-
ready determined by EPA to be confidential business information, 
would resolve the current inconsistency in the law. Presumably, the 
Agency could serve adequately as the public's representative in 
determining what controls are dictated by the undisclosed effluent 
data. 
IV. EPA ACCESS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADDRESSING 
ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS AT HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES; A 
BRAVE NEW WORLD OF CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND 
POLICY CONCERNS 
A. Introduction 
Toxic substance and hazardous waste control has recently captured 
the attention of the public. Estimates of the number of waste disposal 
248 [d. 
249 [d. 
260 40 C.F.R. § 2.302(a)(2)(ii) (1988). 
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sites posing substantial threats to public health and the environment 
range from one to several thousand of the nearly hundred thousand 
existing waste disposal sites. The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or 
Superfund),251 as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA),252 is an attempt to address the 
nation's hazardous waste problem. 
CERCLA initially established a $1.6 billion response fund, 87.6% 
of which was financed by taxes on petrochemical feedstocks, with 
the remainder supplied by the federal treasury.253 The fund is used 
primarily to underwrite the cost of EPA "responses" to those haz-
ardous waste sites that are not being adequately addressed by "re-
sponsible parties."254 CERCLA authorizes the federal government 
to bring suit against parties owning waste facilities to recover the 
costs of cleanup and to collect damages for the destruction of gov-
ernmentally owned natural resources. 255 
Response is defined in CERCLA as "remove, removal, remedy or 
remedial action . . . [including] enforcement activities related 
thereto. "256 "Remedial actions" or "remedies" are response actions 
consistent with a permanent cleanup of the site;257 "removal" includes 
such short-term actions as are necessary to clean up or remove 
hazardous substances, to monitor, assess, and evaluate a release, to 
dispose of removed material, or to prevent, minimize, or mitigate 
damage to the public or to the environment. 258 
Both removal and remedy are defined broadly to give the Agency 
the ability to respond to threats from hazardous waste sites, and to 
design and utilize temporary and permanent measures to abate those 
threats. CERCLA is unique among environmental statutes because 
its entire thrust is to remedy pre-existing environmental hazards 
through the application of engineering and technology. Most other 
environmental legislation focuses on prevention of environmental 
251 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). 
252 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b) (1982) (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1982». The fund was 
increased by the Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 501-31, 100 Stat. 
1613 (1986). 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
254 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(25), 9607 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). This Article focuses upon those 
situations where the relevant state agency is not taking the lead in the cleanup activities, and 
does not deal with state enforcement against potentially responsible parties. 
255Id. § 9607(a)-(e). 
256 I d. § 9601(25). 
257Id. § 9601(23). 
258 I d. § 9601(24). 
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degradation before it occurs. While those acts contain enforcement 
or remedial provisions, CERCLA's landscape is dominated by these 
concerns. 
Because CERCLA is remedial in nature, implementation of the 
Act raises a plethora of issues regarding EPA access to commercial 
property for purposes of designing and engineering a response to 
the hazards present. The typical CERCLA cleanup or response 
action presumably will require access of a longer duration, and cause 
substantially more disruption than the usual inspection or sampling 
visit, consequently raising graver fourth amendment privacy ques-
tions. Thus, the government needs sound statutory grounds to sup-
port its presence on commercial property for Superfund activity. 
Moreover, because the response may interfere with the free use and 
ownership rights in property, the Agency faces other potential con-
stitutional barriers posed by the fifth amendment's taking and due 
process clauses. . 
The litigation that accompanied EPA's efforts to gain access to 
Outboard Marine Corporation COMC) property in order to decontam-
inate Waukegan Harbor on Lake Michigan in Illinois illustrates each 
of these constitutional, statutory, and policy issues.259 The litigation 
proved critical to the evolution of EPA access policy under the 
Superfund law. The federal courts' inability to deal quickly and 
adequately with these access questions ultimately prompted Con-
gress to enact measures which substantially clarified and strength-
ened EPA's statutory authority to enter commercial property and 
conduct cleanups of hazardous waste sites. The primary issues re-
maining in the wake of the OMC litigation and the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act involve reconciling EPA re-
sponse actions with the fifth amendment prohibition against uncom-
pensated takings of private property for public use. Satisfactory 
resolution of those issues may dictate whether or not CERCLA's 
noble goals are achievable. 
B. The Seminal Case o/Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas26o 
The OMC case was a microcosm of the nightmare confronting the 
nation in its efforts to decontamin~te the ravages of hazardous pol-
lution created during the first century of substantial industrial prog-
269 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 883 
(7th Cir. 1985), em. granted, 479 U.S. 811, vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). 
260 Id. 
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ress. The case presented many of the typical conditions confronting 
EPA when attempting to render a site harmless: long-standing ac-
cumulations of chemical contamination resistant to treatment or re-
moval; potentially responsible parties unwilling to voluntarily con-
duct cleanups because of the enormous cost involved; difficulty in 
conclusively proving imminent environmental or health dangers due 
to a number of factors including causation, latency period of the 
harmful effects of the chemical, and synergistic effects of other 
chemicals; years of litigation; and little actual cleanup ultimately 
accomplished. 261 
1. Background Facts of the OMC Case 
OMC owns a major industrial complex on property near Waukegan 
Harbor on Lake Michigan in Illinois. OMC's corporate headquarters 
is located at the site, where the company manufactures outboard 
motors, lawn mowers, and industrial turf care machinery.262 EPA 
charged that, over a span of twenty years, OMC's unauthorized 
discharges of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from its facility had 
resulted in the contamination of a drainage ditch that is a tributary 
to Waukegan Harbor and Lake Michigan.263 The PCB contamination 
is located both on property owned by OMC (the drainage ditch and 
a parking lot) and property not owned by OMC (Upper Waukegan 
Harbor, Slip No.3 of Waukegan Harbor, and Lake Michigan).264 
Waukegan Harbor, a navigable body of water, is used by several 
industries and recreational facilities for docking. EPA estimates that 
approximately 1.1 million pounds of PCBs are contained in the site, 
which ranked 82nd of the initial 541 sites on the National Priority 
List (NPL) of hazardous waste sites in need of cleanup action. 265 
Waukegan Harbor was the number one priority CERCLA site in 
the State of Illinois. 266 
EPA spent seven years of protracted discovery and litigation in 
an effort to force OMC to clean up the PCB contamination. In 1984, 
EPA sought to voluntarily dismiss its suit against OMC and, pur-
suant to section 104 of CERCLA, conduct its own remedial action, 
261 [d. 
262 Outboard Marine, 773 F.2d at 885. 
263 Outboard Marine, 610 F. Supp. at 123'6. 
264 [d. 
265 Rankings reflect the degree of "relative risk or danger to public health or welfare or the 
environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The original NPL appeared as 
Appendix B to the regulations implementing CERCLA at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1985). 
266 Outboard Marine, 773 F.2d at 884-85. 
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with a view to later suing the responsible parties for the govern-
ment's costs of cleanup pursuant to section 107 of the Act. 267 
Naturally, the first step in EPA's remedial process was to gain 
access to OMC's property in order to conduct field investigations 
necessary to design a remedy. The Agency sought permission from 
OMC to conduct a "walk-through" of the OMC property, survey the 
site, set markers, and collect up to twenty-three soil borings to 
determine the ground's weight-bearing capacity.268 EPA labelled 
these preliminary response activities Phase 1. 269 Sixteen EPA offi-
cials, using seven automobiles, were to conduct the initial inspection. 
The surveying would require three people and a van; the soil borings 
about seventeen officials and sixteen vehicles. 270 Approximately 
1,000 square feet of parking area would be needed for the equipment. 
EPA estimated that the task would take a maximum of seventy 
days.271 
Phase 2 of EPA proposed response action constituted the imple-
mentation and construction portion of EPA's remedial plan, requir-
ing the dredging or excavation of thousands of cubic yards of PCB 
sediments from the harbor, north ditch, and OMC parking lot, and 
transporting the material to OMC's harbor-front property for years 
of treatment in lagoons and other facilities constructed by EPA. 272 
The residue from the treatment process would be permanently 
housed in a "containment cell" to be built on OMC property. EPA 
estimated that construction would take three and one-half years, and 
the facilities would occupy six acres of OMC's parking lot. 273 
When permission was refused to conduct the Phase 1 operation, 
EPA obtained an ex parte warrant from a federal magistrate. 274 
OMC sought to quash the warrant on several grounds, and to enjoin 
EPA from proceeding with Phase 1 activities. 275 
2. Issues Raised by OMC 
OMC based its judicial challenge to EPA access on two constitu-
tional arguments: (1) that Phase 1 and Phase 2 activities on its 
267 See id. at 885 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1982)). 
268 [d. 
269 [d. 
270 [d. 
271 [d. 
272 [d. at 885-86. 
273 [d. 
274 [d. at 886-87. 
275 See id. 
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property were an uncompensated taking of its property and a de-
privation of property without due process of law, both in contraven-
tion of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution; and 
(2) that the ex parte issuance of the warrant violated the fourth 
amendment, because it allegedly was issued without probable 
cause.276 
Underlying these claims were several fundamental unresolved is-
sues concerning EPA's access authority under CERCLA. The pri-
mary question was whether or not the Act, prior to the amendments 
of 1986, authorized access to facilitate response actions contemplated 
by the government. 277 Secondarily, OMC charged that even if EPA 
did have access authority, the Agency was unauthorized to under-
take the remedy, because EPA had not been expressly empowered 
to condemn property to effectuate a cleanup.278 Finally, OMC as-
serted that since EPA's "taking" was unauthorized, OMC could not 
resort to the Tucker Act to obtain the compensation required under 
the fifth amendment. 279 
The district court denied OMC's request for a preliminary injunc-
tion quashing the warrant based on the fifth amendment, holding 
that, if EPA's actions were adjudicated to be a taking, the corpo-
ration could subsequently resort to the Tucker Act for compensa-
tion.280 The court also found that EPA's ex parte warrant was sup-
ported by probable cause and was otherwise consistent with the 
fourth amendment.281 Finally, the court found that OMC was not 
entitled to an injunction because it had not shown a substantial 
likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its fifth amendment due 
process claim. 282 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision based 
upon what the court of appeals perceived as a lack of any provision 
in CERCLA authorizing access.283 As has been illustrated in other 
contexts,284 if a court finds a search statutorily unauthorized, it 
necessarily also finds a fourth amendment violation, assuming the 
276 Outboard Marine, 610 F. Supp. at 1238; U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V. 
277 See Outboard Marine, 773 F.2d at 886. 
278 See Outboard Marine, 610 F. Supp. at 1238. 
279 See id. at 1239. The relevant Tucker Act provisions are found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 
(1982). 
280 See Outboard Marine, 610 F. Supp. at 1244. 
281 See id. 
282 [d. at 1245. 
283 Outboard Marine, 773 F.2d at 890-91. 
284 The Seventh Circuit did not address the validity of the Phase I activities since a search 
conducted in the absence of statutory authorization is presumptively unreasonable. 
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court in fact reaches the issue at all. Thus, the reach of EPA's access 
authority under CERCLA is the key inquiry to both OMC decisions. 
3. CERCLA's Entry and Access Provisions 
EPA based its application for a warrant upon sections 104(a) , 
104(b), and 104(c) as they appeared in the original Superfund law.285 
Section 104(b) was the provision most closely associated with the 
type of response action anticipated by Phase 1 of the OMC plan: 
(b) Whenever the President is authorized to act pursuant to 
subsection (a) of this section, or whenever the President has 
reason to believe that a release has occurred or is about to occur, 
or that illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attributable 
to exposure to a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant 
and that a release may have occurred or be occurring, he may 
undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and 
other information gathering as he may deem necessary or ap-
propriate to identify the existence and extent of the release or 
threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous sub-
stances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and the extent of 
danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment. In 
addition, the President may undertake such planning, legal, 
fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and other studies 
or investigations as he may deem necessary or appropriate to 
plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof, 
and to enforce the provisions of this chapter. 286 
The highlighted portions of this section clearly authorize the Agency, 
acting on behalf of the President, to conduct the surveying, soil 
testing, and other design work in preparation for actual construction 
in Phase 2. The Seventh Circuit found the failure of the provision to 
explicitly grant entry and access to be fatal to EPA's ex parte 
warrant. 287 
Far more persuasive than the circuit court's analysis is the district 
court's finding that a right of entry is implicit in section 104(b).288 
Congress, intending the government to undertake "planning . . . 
engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as 
... necessary ... to direct response actions," certainly also intended 
that the Agency have access to the property where such engineering 
and investigation takes place.289 The courts will go to some lengths 
285 42 u.s.c. § 9604(a}-(c) (1982). 
286 [d. § 9604(b) (emphasis added). 
287 Outboard Marine, 773 F.2d at 890. 
288 See Outboard Marine, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1243 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
289 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982). 
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to avoid the absurd result rendered if EPA has the right to construct 
containment cells and other pollution abatement structures, but no 
right to enter the property upon which the structure is to be con-
structed. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that an 
agency's grant of power carries with it the right to use all means 
and instrumentalities necessary to the beneficial exercise of the agen-
cy's expressly conferred powers. 290 The courts have generally held 
that administrative agencies have implied power to take actions that 
enable them to fulfill the tasks entrusted to the government by 
statute. 291 
This interpretation is consonant with both the legislative history 
ofCERCLA292 and the Agency's own interpretation of its authorizing 
statute, which should be accorded great deference by the courts. 293 
Moreover, the district court's opinion in OMC is consistent with 
recent environmental decisions by the Supreme Court, most notably 
the Dow overflight case, analyzed previously, in which the Court 
inferred specific inspection capabilities from the broad access and 
inspection authority given to EPA under the Clean Air Act. 294 
Support for the district court's decision is also provided by section 
104(a)(1), which authorizes the government to respond to releases 
of hazardous wastes, arrange for the removal of the waste, and take 
other remedial action. 295 This authorization undeniably grants to the 
290 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631 (1973) (laws 
must be construed as a whole; courts must give provisions of a statute the "most harmonious 
comprehensive meaning possible"). 
291 See, e.g., Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(INS right to enter commercial premises with warrant to investigate potential violations Qf 
immigration laws derived from general statutory power to locate illegal aliens), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 940 (1982); United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980) (even though tax code 
did not explicitly authorize IRS to summon an individual to produce certain kinds of evidence, 
such authority "is necessary for the effective exercise of Service's enforcement responsibili-
ties"); Lovgren v. Byrne, 787 F.2d 857, 866 (3d Cir. 1986) (authority to inspect vessels without 
warrant implicitly authorizes warrantless dock inspections). 
292 Congress intended a mechanism to "get on immediately with the business of cleaning up 
the thousands of hazardous waste sites which dot this country." 126 Congo Rec. H 31964 (daily 
ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (emphasis added). It was further intended that 
cleanup actions be initiated immediately without the need to await administrative and judicia! 
determinations of liability. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, 22, 56, 62 
(1980). 
293 Udall V. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1985); see also E.!. du Pont de Nemours & CO. V. 
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134--36 (1977). 
294 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. 
295 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982) provides: 
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of 
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of 
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an 
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Agency broad power to take action to decontaminate sites. Gaining 
access to commercial property could either be interpreted as a "re-
sponse measure" in itself, or implicit in the response actions that are 
specified elsewhere in the statute, and which are meaningless with-
out the power of entry and access. Thus, Congress intended that 
EPA promptly and flexibly respond to environmental hazards, with-
out the delays inherent in litigating the reasonableness of EPA's 
determinations. 296 
Ironically, section 104(e), which specifically grants access in certain 
circumstances, originally did not explicitly grant access for the pur-
pose of conducting response actions: 
[d. 
(e)(l) For purposes of assisting in determining the need for 
response to a release under this subchapter or enforcing the 
provisions of this subchapter, any person who stores, treats or 
disposes of, or, where necessary to ascertain facts not available 
at the facility where such hazardous substances are located, who 
generates, transports, or otherwise handles or has handled, haz-
ardous substances shall, upon request of any officer, employee, 
or representative of the President, duly designated by the Pres-
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is 
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange 
for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous sub-
stance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any con-
taminated natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the 
national contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public 
health or welfare or the environment, unless the President determines that such 
removal and remedial action will be done properly by the owner or operator of the 
vessel or facility from which the release or threat of release emanates, or by any 
other responsible party. 
296 In discussing section 104 of CERCLA, the Senate Committee on Environmental and 
Public Works stated that: 
[t]he paramount purpose of this section is the protection of the public health, welfare 
and the environment. It is recognized that government response will often be nec-
essary prior to receipt of evidence which conclusively establishes the substances or 
materials released or the origin of their release, discharge or disposal. Because delay 
will often exacerbate an already serious situation, the bill authorizes the President 
to respond when a substantial threat of release may exist. This standard is intended 
to be a flexible one and holds that it is preferable to err on the side of protecting 
public health, welfare and the environment in administering the response authority 
of the Fund. 
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1980) (emphasis added). 
The courts have also emphasized the congressional intent that the federal government be 
given the ability to effectuate a "prompt and effective response to problems of national 
magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal [and therefore, CERCLA is not to be 
narrowly interpreted so as to] frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly and 
effectively. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 
1982). 
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ident, or upon request of any duly designated officer, employee, 
or representative of a State, where appropriate, furnish infor-
mation relating to such substances and permit such person at all 
reasonable times to have access to, and to copy all records re-
lating to such substances. For the purposes specified in the 
preceding sentence, such officers, employees, or representatives 
are authorized -
(A) to enter at reasonable times any establishment or other 
place where such hazardous substances are or have been gen-
erated, stored, treated, or disposed of, or transported from; 
(B) to inspect and obtain samples from any person of any such 
substances and samples of any containers or labeling for such 
substances. Each such inspection shall be commenced and com-
pleted with reasonable promptness. If the officer, employee, or 
representative obtains any samples, prior to leaving the prem-
ises, he shall give to the owner, operator, or person in charge a 
receipt describing the sample obtained. 297 
This confusing section is at once expansive and narrow. The pow-
ers contained in subsections (A) and (B) to enter and to inspect and 
obtain samples are ostensibly for the purpose of enforcing CERCLA. 
However, qualifying language in subsections (A) and (B) makes such 
an interpretation impossible. Most importantly, subsection (B) au-
thorizes inspections and sampling "of any such substance and sam-
ples of any containers or labeling," referring only to hazardous sub-
stances on the site. Furthermore, the body of the provisions clearly 
is directed at obtaining information from records or documents at 
hazardous waste sites. Therefore, neither the district court nor the 
appeals court was willing to give section 104(e) the broad interpre-
tation, allowing Phase 1 preliminary construction activities, that 
EPA advocated. 298 
Many attribute Congress's initial failure to include a more explicit 
provision authorizing access to conduct response activities to the 
haste with which Congress forged a compromise CERCLA bill at 
the end of the 1980 legislative term.299 Perhaps Congress felt that 
297 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(l) (1982). 
298 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 889 (7th Cir. 1985); Outboard Marine 
Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
299 The usual procedure would have called for a conference committee to work out a bill 
acceptable to both houses. Instead, the House agreed to adopt the amended Senate bill in its 
entirety. As a result, there is no conference report and little legislative history on the Act, 
other than the floor debates preceding the adoption of the final bill by the Senate on November 
28, 1980, and by the House on December 2, 1980, and the legislative histories of the original 
House and Senate bills (H.R. 7020 and S. 1486, respectively). Because Representative Florio 
was a sponsor of CERCLA, his remarks during the floor debate are given particular weight. 
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the expansive response authority given to the Agency made a sep-
arate access provision unnecessary, since the ability to gain access 
is implied in those provisions. 300 
In light of its decision in Dow, the Supreme Court almost certainly 
would have overturned the appellate court's decision had the OMC 
case been heard. 301 However, because ambiguities and problems in 
the statutory access provisions were exposed by the OMC case and 
other actions, Congress shored up CERCLA's inspection and access 
provisions. This congressional action mooted the access issues raised 
in OMC for future cleanup efforts.302 The Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) explicitly grants EPA au-
thority to enter private property for a broad range of purposes 
including "where entry is needed to determine the need for response 
or the appropriate response or to effectuate a response action under 
this subchapter. "303 The term "response action" was also broadened 
to include enforcement measures. 304 
Attempting to close other loopholes regarding CERCLA's access 
and response provisions exposed by the OMC litigation, Congress 
See United States v. Chern-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("[S]tatements of 
the legislation's sponsor are properly accorded substantial weight in interpreting the stat-
ute. "). For a legislative history of the gradual evolution of the access provision now contained 
in the SARA Amendments, see S. REP. No. 11, Senate Comm. on Environment and Public 
Works, (March 8, 1985), and two bills that did not become law, the proposed Superfund 
Amendments of 1985, § 104(e)(1)--(2) (December 10, 1985), and the proposed Superfund Im-
provement Act, § 120(1)(B) (Sept. 25, 1985). 
300 See supra notes 285-96 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text. 
302 See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986), vacating judgment and 
remanding 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985) (case remanded for reconsideration in light of SARA). 
303 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988). 
304 Id. § 9601(25). The expanded authority to enter commercial and other property states, 
in full, that: 
Any officer, employee, or representative described in paragraph (1) is authorized 
to enter at reasonable times any of the following: 
(A) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where any 
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant may be or has been generated, 
stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from. 
(B) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property from which or 
to which a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant has been or may have 
been released. 
(C) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where such 
release is or may be threatened. 
(D) Any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or property where entry is 
needed to determine the need for response or the appropriate response or to effec-
tuate a response action under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(3) (Supp. I 1989). 
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also expanded EPA's authority to inspect, take samples, and obtain 
documentary information. 305 Thus, SARA, in one bold stroke, elim-
inated much of the ambiguity and many of the problems inherent in 
the CERCLA access provisions. 
SARA clarified EPA's statutory authority to gain access to com-
n :ercial property and to conduct response actions under CERCLA. 
'While Congress again failed to include express authority for EPA to 
proceed without a warrant, EPA could assert that the SARA lan-
guage anticipates both warrantless entry and entry pursuant to 
warrant. 306 For policy reasons discussed previously,307 EPA ordinar-
ily wants to obtain a warrant or institute alternative procedures, 
such as a plenary suit for access, prior to entry in situations in which 
access will be for an extended period of time. 
4. Alternate Means of Gaining Access for Superfund Responses 
a. Unilateral Agency Orders as Substitute for Warrant 
In SARA, Congress went further than simply giving EPA clear 
authority to enter commercial or other property to conduct the full 
range of CERCLA response and enforcement activities. The Act 
also established an in personam, non-adjudicative, order mechanism 
that ostensibly allows the President, working through EPA officials, 
to issue compliance orders when access is refused. 308 Congress in-
tended such orders to be enforceable in court, and sought to punish 
noncompliance with reasonable orders by fines of up to $25,000 for 
each day of noncompliance. 309 
Entry pursuant to a unilateral EPA order is not the legal equiv-
alent of entry pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by a 
neutral and independent judicial officer. If the owner, operator, or 
possessor of commercial property is entitled under the fourth amend-
ment to insist upon the presentation of a judicially issued warrant 
before entry is effectuated, that person may not be penalized for 
"disobeying" or refusing to honor a unilateral administrative order 
305 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(e)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1988). 
306 See supra notes 99-177 and accompanying text. 
307 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
308 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(5) (Supp. IV 1986). 
309 [d. § 9604(e)(5)(B). 
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allowing entry.310 Moreover, if an owner or possessor acquiesces in 
EPA's compliance order and allows EPA to enter, that person could 
later allege that consent to entry was coerced by EPA's show of 
force, was involuntary, or was legally ineffective.311 Therefore, the 
EPA order provision in SARA is of dubious constitutional validity, 
unless warrantless searches are authorized by SARA, or one of the 
judicially developed exceptions to the warrant requirement is pres-
ent. 312 
b. Renewable Warrants and Plenary Judicial Action Before 
Access or Response 
Unless EPA wants to test its authority to proceed without a 
warrant, the Agency should ordinarily obtain an administrative war-
rant, rather than rely on its SARA order authority, before proceed-
ing with costly and time-consuming response actions under CER-
CLA and SARA.313 In fact, in light of the extraordinary nature of 
Superfund response actions, the Agency should probably consider 
alternatives to a warrant wpen it initiates response actions that will 
require lengthy stays on commercial property and are likely to raise 
complex legal issues. 314 
Unlike most criminal warrants, an administrative warrant need 
not be limited in duration.315 A neutral judicial officer, however, is 
unlikely to issue a warrant, even under Superfund, for an unlimited 
period of time. 316 Typically, a magistrate imposes time limits suffi-
cient to allow concrete actions to be completed. This causes problems 
in Superfund cases because the scope of EPA's response actions may 
not be known or knowable from the outset. In such cases the warrant 
may be issued incrementally or renewed periodically according to 
timetables established by the magistrate. Renewed warrants or in-
310 Supreme Court doctrine prohibits the government from forcing individuals to choose 
between exercising a constitutional right and then suffering penalty as a result, or not 
exercising that right. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 78-81 (1982). 
:HI See supra note 146. 
312 If the government is authorized to proceed without a warrant, the owner or possessor 
of the property has no fourth amendment right to insist upon one. Therefore, the order and 
subsequent penalty would not penalize the exercise of a constitutional right in those cases. 
313 See supra notes 99-153 and accompanying text. 
314 See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text. 
315 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
316 Most judges would view such action as an abuse of judicial discretion and potentially 
violative of the fourth amendment requirements, including the "reasonable search" constraints 
on scope and duration. 
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crementally issued warrants seem to be the best balance between 
the desire for streamlined procedures and the need for periodic 
judicial review of the circumstances as a means of protecting the 
rights of commercial property owners or those in possession. 
EPA also has the option of seeking declaratory judgment on ac-
ce,cs, constitutional taking, or other issues instead of, or in addition 
to, obtaining a warrant. 317 Proceeding under the All Writs Act is yet 
another option.318 Some form of plenary court action designed to 
clarify EPA's authority prior to EPA's obtaining access may be 
preferable in extreme cases where governmental presence on the 
property will be long-standing or permanent.319 
SARA explicitly preserved all of the various EPA access options-
with or without a warrant, pursuant to SARA's statutory access or 
order provisions, or via plenary judicial action-by including a "dis-
claimer of exclusivity" provision in the amendment: 
OTHER AUTHORITY. Nothing in this subsection shall pre-
clude the President from securing access or obtaining informa-
tion in any other lawful manner. 320 
This provision precludes the legal argument, used successfully in 
other contexts, that Congress, by stating some access options ex-
plicitly in SARA, meant to exclude other legal means of accomplish-
ing the same entry and access. 321 
317 Such a case would be initiated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1982); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(b) (1982) (United States district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies 
arising under CERCLA). For example, EPA has filed civil actions and obtained federal district 
court orders facilitating entry and response activity. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 687 F. 
Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1987) ("order in aid of access" granted under SARA section 9604(e)); 
United States v. Coleman Evans Woods Preserving, Civil Case No. 85-211 CIV-O-18 (M.D. 
Fla. June 10, 1985) (access granted under CERCLA pre-SARA). 
318 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). A judge may also issue an All Writs order to aid in the execution 
of a prior warrant. See United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 175 n.23 (1977); 
but see Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1979). 
319 See infra notes 348-61 and accompanying text. 
320 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1986). 
321 See, e.g., In re Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1131-32 (3d Cir. 1982); Interstate 
Commerce Comm'n v. Peninsula Shippers Ass'n, 789 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986). The 
better rule allows a judge to issue an administrative warrant if the statute in question confers 
a substantive entry right without restricting the methods an agency may use to obtain access. 
See, e.g., Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Bunker Hill Co. Lead and Zinc Smelter v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1981); Midwest 
Growers Coop. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 462 (9th Cir. 1976). The nonexclusivity provision 
also strengthens EPA's position that it can proceed without a warrant. At least one unsuc-
cessful attempt has already been made to restrict EPA access options under SARA. See 
United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass. 1988) (court 
upheld EPA access options under SARA). 
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C. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Restraints on EPA Response 
Actions 
1. Revisiting Fourth Amendment Implications for Response 
Action, Post-SARA 
The OMC litigation is as significant for the issues that it failed to 
resolve as it is for the issues directly addressed. The district court 
briefly analyzed the emerging constitutional issues. However, be-
cause of the procedural context of the case in the lower court,322 the 
trial court's analysis was not dispositive. Because the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found CERCLA's response provisions devoid 
of authorization for entry or access, the court never reached the 
difficult constitutional issues. 323 Nevertheless, fourth and fifth 
amendment issues are lurking, ready to be raised whenever EPA 
attempts response action at a hazardous waste site. 
Whatever formulation of the fourth amendment test is utilized , 324 
it is clear that the commercial privacy interests it is designed to 
protect fall on a continuum. 325 As analyzed previously, governmental 
actions that do not require EPA officials to be physically present on 
commercial property may not even trigger fourth amendment con-
cerns. 326 On-site inspections, information gathering, and sampling 
programs authorized by statute are significant enough intrusions 
ordinarily to require a warrant. 327 If not required, EPA may find it 
advisable to seek a warrant anyway for practical or policy reasons. 328 
Governmental presences of longer duration-for example, to ex-
ecute the Phase 1 EPA response at the OMC site-clearly require 
that government pay close attention to the valid privacy interests 
322 OMC's complaint sought a preliminary injunction. Because no fact-finding hearing had 
been convened, the court was required to assume that all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint were true. Therefore, for the purposes of ruling on OMC's motion, the court assumed 
that the Phase 1 activities were a "taking" requiring "just compensation" and that EPA's 
activities entailed a deprivation of property sufficient to trigger the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 1234, 1236, 1239-40, 1244-
45 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 773 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated and renwnded, 479 U.S. 1002 
(1986). 
323 See Outboard Marine Corp. V. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 888-91 (7th Cir. 1985). 
324 See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
325 The more disruptive an agency action and the longer its duration, the greater the degree 
of fourth amendment scrutiny triggered. In addition, at a critical point, fifth amendment 
concerns are implicated. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
326 See supra notes 15-28 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra notes 71-104 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text. 
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of the commercial property owner. With the recent strengthening of 
the CERCLA access provisions by SARA, it is unlikely that a court 
would find response activities constitutionally unreasonable under 
the fourth amendment. The courts might, however, hold that a 
Barlow's warrant is required. Ex parte warrant procedures, or other 
plenary judicial actions, should be invoked in most instances. More-
over, as administrative activity on private property increases in 
intensity and duration, fourth amendment and policy analysis begins 
to bleed into other constitutional arteries, notably fifth amendment 
concerns for uncompensated takings and deprivations of due pro-
cess. 329 Finally, EPA responses requiring permanent construction on 
private property raise all of the above-stated issues, as well as the 
question of adequate compensation. 
2. Response Actions Analyzed Under the Takings Clause 
At some level of governmental interference with the exercise of 
private property rights, the fifth amendment's prohibition against 
the taking of property without just compensation is implicated. 330 
That prohibition prevents the government "from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole."331 
The taking clause originally was intended to prevent the govern-
ment from confiscating property from one private individual and 
giving it to another.332 If no valid state or federal purpose could be 
shown for the governmental action in question, a prohibited taking 
had occurred. 333 Thus, the Supreme Court has uniformly required 
the government to pass the threshold test of showing a legitimate 
329 u.s. CONST. amend. V. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
330 U.S. CON ST. amend. V. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. The Supreme 
Court also began enforcing the prohibition on taking without just compensation against the 
states as a matter of fourteenth amendment due process as early as 1896. See Missouri Pac. 
Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 417 (1896). It is beyond the scope of this Article to pursue all 
of the specialized law pertaining to eminent domain, taking, and just compensation. Some of 
the more influential works on the subject include J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989); B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); and 
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). Professor Tribe 
attempts a short synthesis in his revised treatise on constitutional law. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587-613 (2d ed. 1988) ([hereinafter TRIBEJ. 
331 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
332 See generally TRIBE, supra note 330, at 588-89. 
333 I d. at 589. 
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public purpose in the activity being challenged as a taking. 334 Over 
the last century, however, the Court has eroded the public purpose 
test, reflecting an ever-widening view of legitimate governmental 
interests in regulating private property.335 Without question, the 
federal government's activities in conservation, environmental pro-
tection, and public health and safety, as codified in the nation's 
environmental laws, are directed at valid public purposes.336 
Permissible governmental action, admittedly designed to promote 
valid public environmental and health interests, may still be deemed 
a taking requiring just compensation. 337 For example, if the govern-
ment takes title from a private owner of land to expand the offices 
of the Environmental Protection Agency, the taking clause would 
require that the owner be compensated, because such a physical 
takeover would totally destroy the private owner's enjoyment of and 
right to use the land. 338 A taking also occurs if the government so 
tightly or completely controls a person's use of property that its 
value is virtually destroyed. 339 
Less clear, however, is how far the government can "regulate" or 
interfere with the private use ofland for valid public purpose without 
effecting a taking that requires compensating the owner.340 Nearly 
every governmental action has an impact on the private use and 
enjoyment of property.341 As Justice Holmes stated in 1922, "while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking."342 
Determining how far is "too far" has plagued the Court ever since, 
and few general principles have emerged beyond the public purpose 
test. For over a century the Court has engaged in a case-by-case 
334 I d. at 588-613. 
335 See id. at 589-91. 
336 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1987) 
(valid public purpose includes conservation). For a review of some of the major taking cases 
involving environmental regulation, see Torres, Wetlands and Agriculture: Environmental 
Regulation and the Limits of Private Property, 34 U. RAN. L. REV. 539, 553-62 (1986). See 
generally Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Search for a Better Rule, 
18 ENVTL. L. 3 (1987). 
337 See TRIBE, supra note 330, § 9-3, at 593. 
338 See id. at 592-93. 
339 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922); TRIBE, supra note 
330, at 593. 
340 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 175 (1979); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 713 (1987). See generally TRIBE, supra note 
330, § 9-4. 
341 See generally TRIBE, supra note 330, § 9-2, at 591. 
342 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
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factual analysis, leaving in its wake some inexplicable decisions and 
many confused lawyers.343 In the 1978 case of Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City,344 the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
its commitment to "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" in "regula-
tory" taking cases, and to a case-by-case balancing of public and 
private interests. 345 The Court did little to alter this approach in 
three 1987 cases. 346 Such balancing requires consideration of the 
character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its 
interference with investment-backed expectations. 347 According to 
Professor Tribe, the upshot of recent Supreme Court doctrine is that 
the Court is unlikely to find that a governmental regulatory action 
constitutes a taking if 
(1) [it] advances some public interest, but also (2) falls short of 
destroying any classically recognized element of the bundle of 
property rights, (3) leaves much of the commercial value of the 
property untouched, and (4) includes at least some reciprocity of 
benefit . . . .348 
A general guide for takings analysis for CERCLA response actions 
emerges from an application of these factors to the proposed OMC 
Phase 1 and 2 activities. 
Even substantial intrusions on private property for the purpose 
of inspecting, sampling, and designing an Agency-engineered 
343 See TRIBE, supra note 330, at 595-96. 
344 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
345 I d. at 124. 
346 Three important decisions in 1987 indicate that the Supreme Court is still wedded to an 
ad hoc, case-by-case assessment of the facts in taking cases. See Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (Coastal Commission decision conditioning approval of 
rebuilding permit on beach property owner's granting an easement for lateral access across 
private property to public beaches held a taking because condition did not rationally relate to 
valid public purpose); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles 
County, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) ("temporary" regulatory takings are compensable); Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (mere enactment of statute that 
requires 50 percent of the coal beneath certain structures be kept in place to provide surface 
support held not a taking). For a preliminary analysis of these cases, see TRIBE, supra note 
330, § 9-4, at 595-99 & nn.2, 13. 
347 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); see also YMCA v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 85, 93 (1969) (occupation of and damage to building by soldiers attempting 
to quell riot held not a taking). 
348 TRIBE, supra note 330, § 9-4, at 597. These criteria elaborate upon the Supreme Court's 
own articulation of the relevant factors. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981) (factors include character of the governmental action, its 
economic impact, and its interference with investment-backed expectations); see also Agins 
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 
& n.36 (1978). 
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cleanup are not compensible takings. CERCLA actions are by their 
nature regulatory, and designed to protect the public health. Unlike 
construction, such intrusions are transitory. While the Phase 1 op-
eration in OMC could last several months, and cause inconvenience 
to OMC and its employees, the nature of the Agency's anticipated 
activities on the site indicates that they would have had minor eco-
nomic impact on the company. 
Regulatory actions that reduce the economic value of certain pri-
vate property, even to zero, have been upheld, as long as the actions 
taken protect the public from some public nuisance or harm gener-
ated by the property owner. 349 In Miller v. Schoene,350 the Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld a state statute that gave officials the 
authority to order landowners, and, in the absence of compliance, to 
undertake actmn themselves, to destroy healthy cedar trees to avoid 
the possibility of transmitting a disease to adjoining apple orchards. 
The federal courts reached similar results in a long line of cases in 
which governmental actions abating "noxious" uses of private land 
have not been deemed takings. 351 CERCLA response actions might 
well be considered responses to nuisances or other potentially harm-
ful situations either created or tolerated by the landowner. To the 
extent this line of cases controls, no taking, triggering compensation, 
will be found. 
CERCLA prohibits off-site transport of hazardous substances un-
less EPA determines that off-site storage and treatment are more 
cost effective than on-site remedies.352 For this reason, on-site con-
struction such as that contemplated in Phase 2 of the OMC response 
action is not exceptional. 353 Most EPA on-site responses to releases 
of hazardous wastes will result in economic benefit to the property 
owners and to the public at large. Once the hazardous waste is under 
control, or the land d~ontaminated, the property's title is cleared 
349 See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (closure of premises 
where solicitation of prostitution occurred); Adams v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 583-
84 (1913) (destl''.lction of milk which was not tested for tuberculosis); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 
U.S. 16, 19 (1879) (destruction of buildings to contain fire or eliminate health hazard). 
350 276 U.S. 272 (1928); see also National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 
221, 240, 414 A.2d 37, 46-47 (1980) (requiring landowners to clean up pollution caused by 
lessee not a taking). 
351 See, e.g., Arcara, 478 U.S. 697 (1986); Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines. 
239 U.S. 486 (1916); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 
(1887); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); see also TRIBE, supra 
note 330, § 9-3, at 593. 
352 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988). 
353 See supra notes 272--73 and accompanying text. 
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and market value increased. As stated by the Supreme Court, "if 
governmental activities inflict slight damage upon land in one respect 
and actually confer great benefits when measured on the whole, to 
compensate the landowner . . . would be to grant him a special 
bounty. "354 
Phase 1 planning and design activities conducted on uncontami-
nated property owned by "innocent" third parties perhaps do not 
fall as clearly within this benefit doctrine as does the OMC case. 
Nevertheless, the transitory nature of the intrusion, coupled with 
the health and safety purposes underlying those activities should 
shield Agency actions from a taking determination. For example, 
the government may have to declare an easement to pass through 
an innocent party's property to gain access to the hazardous waste 
sites. Finally, there seems to be no doctrinal barrier to planning and 
conducting cleanups on abandoned waste sites, primary targets of 
CERCLA's response provisions, because in such instances there are 
no private ownership interests to protect. 355 
The analysis is more problematic for governmental "physical in-
vasions" that are permanent in nature. Thus, construction and other 
permanent response activities may be on different constitutional 
footing from less onerous governmental responses. Recently, the 
Supreme Court has developed a per se taking rule for extreme forms 
of governmental action. In Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter,356 
the Court held that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by 
the government is a taking without regard to the public interests 
that it may serve."357 Most of the Agency's CERCLA response 
actions escape the sweeping net cast by this test. Whether or not 
EPA construction of a "permanent" structure on private property is 
per se a taking under Loretto is problematic. 
EPA's activities under Phase 2 of the OMC plan are perhaps the 
outer reach of Agency response activities. During Phase 2 the 
Agency intended to dredge PCB sediment from the harbor, north 
ditch, and OMC parking lot, and then transport the materials to the 
OMC harbor front property for years of treatment in lagoons and 
354 United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1939). 
355 See United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792 (D. Pa. 1982), appeal dismissed, 713 
F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1983). 
356 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
357Id. at 426. This case has been severely criticized. See TRIBE, supra note 330, § 9-5, at 
602-04 & n.32. Professor Tribe notes, however, that the per se Loretto rule may be narrowed 
by FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987). See TRIBE, supra note 330, § 9-5, at 
604 & n.32. 
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other facilities to be constructed by EPA. The residue after treat-
ment was to be permanently housed in a fifteen-foot-high "contain-
ment cell" to be built on six acres of OMC property not contaminated 
by PCBS.358 
Several factors indicate that these responses are unlikely to be 
considered "permanent occupations" within the reach of the Loretto 
doctrine. First and most importantly, if EPA did not become the 
titleholder of the land or the containment cells in question, the 
Loretto doctrine might not be invoked. Secondly, the Supreme Court 
has had a tendency in recent years to distinguish between govern-
mental regulatory action taken to protect health and welfare and 
governmental acquisition of property for proprietary reasons. 359 
Thus, the Court views construction of a governmental office very 
differently from building a hazardous waste containment cell on 
private property. 
However, the fact that the permanent containment cell is to be 
located on OMC's uncontaminated parking lot foreshadows even 
more perplexing constitutional dilemmas. For example, what if EPA 
chose uncontaminated private property owned by an "innocent" 
third party for the location of the permanent structure, rather than 
an entity potentially responsible for the health hazard? Objections 
by such parties to bearing an inordinate portion of society's costs for 
the cleanup would probably persuade the court that a taking had 
occurred, and that compensation was in order. 360 
Prior to the recent amendments to CERCLA, a third party prop-
erty owner might have successfully maintained that EPA had no 
condemnation authority under Superfund. SARA, however, resolved 
this collateral issue. If the Agency finds it necessary to condemn 
property in order to effectuate a cleanup, it now has explicit statu-
tory authority to do SO.361 
358 Outboard Marine Corp. v. Thomas, 773 F.2d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 479 
U.S. 811 (1986), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). 
359 Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978) (acquisitions 
for uniquely public functions often held takings) with YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 
93 (1969) (regulatory actions taken to protect public health and safety are uncompensable). 
For a general discussion of takings and the police power, see Sax, Takings, Private Property 
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE 
L.J. 36 (1964). 
360 Such "why me" questions are at the very heart of the taking question. Comment, The 
Hazardous Waste Abatement Liability of Innocent Landowners: A Constitutional Analysis, 
17 PAC. L.J. 185 (1985). 
361 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(j) (West Supp. 1989). The executive branch, however, may be 
reluctant to use this authority. See infra note 370. 
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3. Analysis Under the Due Process Clause 
The fifth amendment prohibits the federal government from de-
priving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law. 362 Due process analysis typically proceeds in two phases: deter-
mining whether a governmental action materially affects life, liberty, 
or property; and, if it does, determining what form of procedural 
safeguards are reasonable and appropriate. 
Of the three constitutional interests protected under the due pro-
cess clause, the courts generally afford property rights the least 
amount of protection. Due process therefore ordinarily does not 
require a judicial hearing before seizure of property.363 The Supreme 
Court has held that "[i]t is sufficient, where only property rights 
are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a 
hearing and a judicial determination. "364 Accordingly, EPA response 
actions, short of permanent construction on private property, raise 
few due process concerns. Any process due a potentially responsible 
party is ordinarily provided after the cleanup is complete and the 
government initiates a cost recovery action in federal court. 365 Re-
sponse actions that are in essence investigations or inspections pur-
suant to warrants are not subject to challenge because the procedure 
for obtaining the warrant constitutes all the process due the affected 
landowner. 366 
In those circumstances in which the Agency constructs permanent 
on-site treatment or containment facilities on private property, the 
due process clause is satisfied through the landowner's ability to 
assert that a taking has occurred in a Court of Claims action for 
compensation under the Tucker Act. 367 These claims should not be 
permitted to delay EPA's response action at the site: 
Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of 
private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when 
a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign 
362 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
363 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). 
364 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) (emphasis added); see 
also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 611. 
365 See J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263,264-66 (6th Cir. 1985). 
366 Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975) (fourth amendment rights sufficient 
to protect defendant in criminal proceeding). 
367 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1982). The Tucker Act procedure is clearly available under 
CERCLA contrary to OMC's assertions. A party is presumed to have a possible Tucker Act 
remedy, unless Congress has manifested an unambiguous intention to withdraw that remedy. 
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subsequent to the taking . . . . The Fifth Amendment does not 
require that compensation precede the taking. 368 
71 
Finally, EPA generally may initiate a declaratory judgment action, 
or similar proceeding in federal court, if a response is remedial in 
nature, and requires an extended presence or the construction of 
permanent structures. 369 These actions afford private landowners an 
additional measure of due process. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is easy to discern that the pri-
mary burdens posed by commercial assertions of fifth amendment 
claims are not ones of substance, but rather of procedure and timing. 
Ascertaining which types of response actions require compensation 
or due process procedures will take years. 370 Preliminary decisions 
under SARA have already sustained EPA's access and response 
authority against takings challenges. 371 Efforts to clean up hazardous 
waste sites cannot await definitive judicial resolution of these issues. 
Therefore, the Agency should adopt the policy that no response 
action on a potentially responsible party's property constitutes a 
taking or violates due process. EPA should further insist that takings 
and due process questions be addressed in Tucker Act proceedings 
which do not delay cleanup activities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Some of EPA's past access policies and practices under traditional 
environmental statutes are ill-suited for the modern demands of 
hazardous waste management. While consensual searches, and other 
warrantless procedures, may have worked well for certain inspec-
tions, they are ineffective or impractical for long-term remedial ac-
tions on commercial property. 
368 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984). 
369 See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text. To facilitate access, the Agency may also 
rely on a writ of assistance under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). 
370 On March 16, 1988, President Reagan issued an executive order that established numer-
ous procedural barriers to executive branch actions that might constitute takings. Exec. Order 
No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988). This order could further slow national progress in decontam-
inating hazardous waste sites. The lack of cases brought, or defended, by the Department of 
Justice concerning condemnation and taking issues evidences the Reagan Administration's 
unfortunate reluctance to use the full authority provided by SARA, as advocated herein. 
371 United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1988) (no taking found); United States v. 
Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass 1988) (governmental entry upon 
hazardous waste site and adjacent land held not to be a taking); Hendler v. United States, 11 
Cl. Ct. 91 (1986) (property owner's motion for summary judgment denied and government's 
motion for summary judgment granted in part and denied in part). 
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When the government enters private property for the purpose of 
technologically abating threats from pollution, its intrusion is more 
substantial, and of a longer duration, than typical inspection visits. 
Technology is the driving force behind the development of a policy 
that relies on ex parte warrants or other court proceedings for 
obtaining access. The need to design and implement technology-
based controls is also driving the Agency toward confrontations with 
commercial interests, drawn along fourth and fifth amendment lines. 
A new era of Agency access policy is predicated upon the resolu-
tion of these issues. Congress, by enacting SARA, and the Supreme 
Court, in handing down the Dow decision, have strengthened EPA 
authority to enter commercial property, conduct inspections, and 
perform remedial actions. In doing so, they have also fortified EPA's 
assertions that such activities are constitutionally reasonable, at 
least when proceeding with an ex parte warrant. The courts have 
already partially resolved the question of whether extended EPA 
visits to commercial property for remedial purposes are constitu-
tionally reasonable in favor of EPA, and have also turned aside the 
first judicial challenges to EPA response activities under the taking 
clause. Only Supreme Court decisions involving a variety of 
CERCLA response actions can dispositively clarify key fifth amend-
ment issues concerning taking and due process requirements. Of 
critical importance to the resolution of those issues will be the scope 
of the intrusion to the private property, the duration of the intrusion, 
and whether or not the response is confined to contaminated sites 
or extends to uncontaminated property owned by innocent third 
parties. 
Timely and adequate resolution of all of these issues will determine 
whether EPA's efforts to abate pollution will be stalled temporarily, 
or permanently, at the gates of commercial property. 
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APPENDIX 
The civil/criminal dichotomy may be plotted on the x axis, the 
warrant/warrantless search distinction plotted on the y axis, and the 
difference between searches for the purpose of investigation and 
compliance and searches designed to facilitate remedial action noted 
on the z axis. 
NO WARRANT 
WARRANT 
REMEDIAL 
COMPLIANCE 
z 
y 
X 
hC=-IV'"IL--L--.C=R""IM=IN""-AL'-
When traced out in three dimensions, four types of searches with 
warrants occupy the "first floor" of fourth amendment space, and 
four types of searches without warrants occupy the "second floor." 
It is also convenient to separate the space vertically with a plane 
between criminal and civil searches. 
CIVIL CRIMINAL 
---.----,.L:--------
WITHOUT 
WARRANT 
:;",,' I 
1 !I 
! 
-------~-------
I 
WITH WARRANT 
~~ 
FOURTH AMENDMENT SPACE 
The eight categories include: 
1. civil search, without warrant, for compliance purposes. 
2. civil search, without warrant, for remedial purposes. 
3. criminal search, without warrant, for compliance purposes. 
4. criminal search, without warrant, for remedial purposes. 
5. civil search, with warrant, for compliance purposes. 
6 civil search, with warrant, for remedial purposes. 
7. criminal search, with warrant, for compliance purposes. 
8. criminal search, with warrant, for remedial purposes. 
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Some commentators have criticized the categories drawn here, par-
ticularly the civil/criminal distinction. See Note, Rationalizing Ad-
ministrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (1979) (en-
dorsing homelbusiness distinction). The categories used here do not 
necessarily indicate philosophical or constitutional fissures, but 
rather focus attention upon the two areas most important to EPA 
access policy, categories 5 and 6. 
